St. John's Law Review
Volume 40, December 1965, Number 1

Article 1

The Court of Claims: Its Development and Present Role in the
Unified Court System
John J. McNamara Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

VOLUME XL

DECEMBER 1965

NuMBER 1

THE COURT OF CLAIMS: ITS DEVELOPMENT AND
PRESENT ROLE IN THE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM
JOHN J. MCNAMARA, JR.t*

T HE New York State Court of Claims is a constitutional
court of record, having exclusive jurisdiction of claims
against the State of New York and certain public authorities.
It may also determine claims by the state against a claimant
or between conflicting claimants, as the legislature may
provide.1 The Court, with its complement of fourteen Judges
appointed by the governor for nine-year terms, is part of
the unified court system, under the supervision of the
Judicial Conference of the State of New York. For administrative purposes, it is supervised by the Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.2 The primary
power of the Court is to grant judgments for money damages
against the State of New York and certain public authorities.
The only equitable power possessed by the Court is
that incidental to its primary power to render a money
judgment.'
Our purpose herein is to consider the development of
the New York Court of Claims, its jurisdiction, function
tChief Law Assistant, New York State Court of Claims. A.B., LL.B.,

Fordham University.
* The opinions expressed in this article are the personal views of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the New York
State Court of Claims nor any of the Judges thereof.

IN.Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 9; N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAW §§ 163-a, 212-a, 358,
469-a, 1607.
2 N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 28; N.Y. JunICIARy LAW § 214.
3
Psaty v. Duryea, 306 N.Y. 413, 118 N.E.2d 584 (1954).
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and operation, and the role it presently plays as part of the
unified court system of the State of New York. In pursuit of this purpose, we shall review such of the history
and background of the Court as is necessary for an
understanding of how the Court came to be and why it
exists. We shall then give consideration to the jurisdiction
of the -Court and its related problems, followed by a
discussion of the principal types of actions brought in the
Court of Claims. After an assessment of the effect that
rulings in Court of Claims' cases have had on the general
substantive law of the state, we will conclude with a discussion of the actual operation of the Court.
Before reviewing the historic development of the Court,
it is best to give some consideration to the nature of
the defendant in a Court of Claims action, for the nature
of this defendant has exerted the greatest causal influence
upon the practice and general operation of the Court. The
Court was created for, and exists for, the purpose of
adjudicating claims against the sovereign State of New
York, which is the only real defendant in the Court of
Claims.' The sovereign is a unique type of defendant. Its
activities reach into every one of the sixty-two counties
and affect every individual citizen therein. The state performs services for the citizen which no private person,
individual or corporate, could or would undertake: it operates a statewide police force, and maintains its own army
and navy; it constructs a vast network of high-speed roads;
it maintains a system of custodial institutions for the
mentally ill, the retarded, the wayward and the criminal;
it engages in a large recreational program which includes
4 Although the

Court has been granted jurisdiction of certain public

authorities by statute, such separate public authorities, both corporate and
politic, are actually arms or agencies of the state, performing governmental
acts. Pantess v. Saratoga Springs Authority, 255 App. Div. 426, 8 N.Y.S2d
103 (3d Dep't 1938); Strang v. State, 206 Misc. 734, 134 N.Y.S.2d 871
(Ct. Cl. 1954), appeal dismissed, 285 App. Div. 1117, 143 N.Y.S.2d 615

(4th Dep't 1955).

See also Easley v. State, 1 N.Y.2d 374, 135 N.E.2d 572,

153 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1956); City of Albany v. State, 21 App. Div. 2d 224, 250
N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dep't 1964), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 1024,207 N.E.2d 864, 260 N.Y.S.

2d 176 (1965). But see Benz v. New York State Thruway Authority, 9 N.Y2d
486, 174 N.E.2d 727, 215 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1961).
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numerous public parks, campsites, ski trails, and other
leisure facilities; it collects taxes, enforces statutes, and
performs a host of other governmental functions peculiar
to a sovereign. It is only natural that, in the course of
such activities, the acts of the sovereign will, at times,
come in conflict with the rights of the individual citizen.
In some areas it is proper and necessary that the rights of
the sovereign be superior to those of the individual. Conversely, there are those areas in which it is equitable that
the individual have redress against the sovereign for violation of his rights. Although the truth of this doctrine
is universally recognized, it has been only in recent years
that practical steps have been taken in many jurisdictions
to enable the citizen to assert his individual rights against
the sovereign, particularly in the field of tort.
The paramount bar to an action at law by an individual
against the sovereign is the ancient doctrine of sovereign
immunity, i.e., the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts
without its consent. This theory, based upon the medieval
concept that the -king can do no wrong, has retained its
vitality in many jurisdictions in this country.5 In these
states, therefore, as a condition precedent to an individual
suit, there must be a consent by the sovereign-a voluntary
waiver of its historic immunity from liability. The sole
exception seems to be in the field of eminent domain, where
the right of an individual to compensation for private
property taken for public use is constitutionally guaranteed.'
In jurisdictions where the sovereign is immune from suit,
the only recourse available to the individual with a private
5 Stason, Symposium, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 1321 (1954).
6 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7. The express
provision against taking private property for public use without just compensation was not in the New York State Constitution prior to 1821.
The right to take private property for public use is an inherent sovereign
power and is not dependent upon constitutional enactment. However, such
right in any free government is dependent upon adequate compensation for
the owner whose property is taken. People ex rel. New York Cent &
Hudson River R.R. v. Priest, 206 N.Y. 274, 99 N.E. 547 (1912). See also
Kahlen v. State, 223 N.Y. 383, 119 N.E. 883 (1918) ; Rexford v. Knight,
11 N.Y. 308 (1854); Gardner v. Trustees of Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns.

Ch. R. 162 (N.Y. 1816).
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claim is to petition the legislature for relief, and to rely
on the sense of justice of that body.'
In 1929, the State of New York abandoned the concept
of sovereign immunity and assumed liability for the torts
of state officers and employees.' Jurisdiction was conferred
on the Court of Claims to hear and determine all claims
against the state for property damage and personal injury
resulting from the misfeasance or negligence of these officers
or employees while acting within the scope of their duties.
This assumption of liability did not spring complete and
Minerva-like from the mind of a Jovian legislature, but
actually was the culmination of a gradual process of removing the armor of immunity which had begun over one
hundred years previously.'
EVOLUTION

OF TM

COURT

As part of the Erie Canal Act of 1817, the legislature
directed the State Canal Commissioners to petition the
supreme court for the appointment of disinterested appraisers to assess damages to the lands of private parties
resulting from canal construction. The Canal Conmissioners were to pay the damages so assessed, and title in
fee to the land so appropriated was to vest in the people
of the state. This was the first general statute providing
for the hearing and determination of private claims against
the State of New York."0 In 1821, the law was amended
to eliminate the distinterested appraisers and the duty
of appraising property taken for canal purposes was assigned
to the Canal Commissioners." Subsequently, further legislation provided that the governor appoint two freeholders
to work in concert with any one Canal Commissioner
7

People ex reL Swift v. Luce, 204 N.Y. 478, 483, 97 N.E. 850, 851
(1912).
8 Laws of New York, 1929, ch. 467.
9For a complete history of the Court of Claims and the procedures
followed in maintaining claims against the State of New York, see generally
DAvIDsoN, CLAIms AGAIST THE STATE oF NEw YoR (1954); BREuER,
THE NE w YORK STATE COURT OF CLAIMs, ITS HisToRy, JuRISIncTION AND
REPORTS (1959).
10 Laws of New York, 1817, ch. 262.
11 Laws of New York, 1821, ch. 36.
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in the assessment of appropriated land. The act also
provided for a method of appeal to the Canal Board. 12
Legislation in 1830 provided that damages resulting
from the flooding of private lands by reason of the
erection of dams on rivers and streams for canal purposes
be subject to appraisal by Canal Commissioners. 3 This
provision, recognizing damage of a tortious nature, was
judicially construed to apply only to permanent, and not
transient, damage to property. 4 State liability was later
extended to include damages occurring to private property
as a result of the temporary occupation thereof or entry
thereon to obtain materials for canal purposes.
In 1870, jurisdiction was conferred upon the Board
of Canal Appraisers to hear and determine private claims
for damages arising from the use and management of the
canals, or from the negligence of any officer of the state
having charge of the canals, or from any accident connected with the canals. 6 The Board was authorized to
prescribe the form of a claim, adopt rules of evidence,
subpoena witnesses, and issue commissions for taking testimony out of the state.
Despite the partial waiver of immunity with respect to
canal claims, the legislature continued to pass upon most
private claims directly, by means of appropriations. There
were many dangers inherent in such a system and thus, in
1874 the state constitution was amended to prohibit the
legislature from auditing or allowing private claims against
the state. 7 The legislative power to appropriate money to
pay claims which were audited and allowed according to
law was continued. The amendment also forbade the audit,
allowance or payment of claims which as between individuals would be barred by a lapse of time."8
12

Laws of New York, 1825, ch. 275.

"1 Laws

of New York, 1830, cl. 293.

14 Heacock & Berry v. State, 105 N.Y. 246, 11 N.E. 638 (1887).
15 Laws of New York, 1836, ch. 287.
18 Laws of New York, 1870, ch. 321.
17 N.Y. CoNsT. art. III, § 19.
18 The amendment was intended to prevent the revival of stale claims
by the legislature.

It prohibited the legislature from subjecting the state

to a less favorable limitation than the citizen, but left untouched the
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In 1876, the legislature created the State Board of
Audit, 9 composed of the Comptroller, the Secretary of
State, and the Treasurer, to hear private claims against
the state which were not heard by the 'Canal Appraisers.
The creation of this Board afforded a forum for the litigation
of contract claims against the state," but it did not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity in tort actions.21
It was required that the Attorney General attend all sessions
of the Board to protect the interests of the state. The
Board was endowed with rule-making power with respect
to the procedure before its monthly sessions, and the concurrence of two members was required for decision in all
claims. Access to the Board of Audit in such actions
was usually had by virtue of an enabling act conferring
jurisdiction on the Board to hear and determine a private
claim. In 1881, provision was made for appeal to the
general term of the supreme court from decisions of the
Board of Audit.2
Two years later, the Board of 'Canal Appraisers and
the State Board of Audit were abolished and jurisdiction
of claims against the State of New York was conferred upon
a newly established Board of Claims 2 whose creation did
not in itself constitute a waiver of immunity in tort cases. 4
The Board of -Claims Act of 1883 established a twoyear limitation for the ing of claims and also provided for
the filing of counterclaims by the state. All the procedural
power to make the limitations equal. See Homer Eng'r Co. v. State,
12 N.Y.2d 508, 191 N.E.2d 455, 240 N.Y.S.2d 973 (1963); Coish v. State,

23 Misc. 2d 117, 203 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Ct. Cf. 1960).

See also 1936 N.Y.

LEG. Doc. No. 65, N.Y. LAw lEvisiox Cmm'N REP. (Q) 975-91. In
Oswego & Syracuse !R. v. State, 226 N.Y. 351, 124 N.E. 8 (1919), the
Court of Appeals held that a cause of action was not barred by lapse of
time as between citizens of the state unless there existed a tribunal of
competent jurisdiction to which they might repair.
29 Laws of New York, 1876, ch. 444.
20
Danolds v. State, 89 N.Y. 36, 51 (1882). Prior to the creation of the
Board of Audit, an individual who had a just claim against the state for
breach of contract could not enforce it legally for want of a legal forum.
His only recourse was to petition the legislature. Lord v. Thomas, 64 N.Y.

107, 109 (1876).
21 Lewis v. State, 96 N.Y. 71 (1884).
Laws of New York 1881, ch. 211.
23 Laws of New York, 1883, ch. 205.
24 Lewis v. State, supra note 21.
22
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powers of the Board of Audit and the Board of Canal
Appraisers were granted to the new Board. Claims were
to be determined by any two of the three commissioners,
and awards were to contain the name of the claimant, the
attorneys, and (in appropriation cases) a description of the
land by metes and bounds. The awards were to be recorded in detail by the Clerk of the Court; those in favor
of the state were conclusive. Where the amount in controversy exceeded five hundred dollars, appeal might be
taken directly to the Court of Appeals. 5
The following year, observation of the prevailing rules
of evidence was mandated by legislative enactment, and
practice before the Board of Claims was required to conform as nearly as possible to that in the Supreme Court
of NTew York State. The records of the Board, when
certified under seal by the Clerk, were entitled to be read
in evidence in any court. 6 Four years later, the Board
was authorized to allow the amendment of claims and the
filing of supplemental claims. It was also provided that
it might reopen hearings for further proof, take more
extensive testimony, and direct the rehearing of claims.
The marshals of the Board were empowered to execute its
process in the same manner as a sheriff. Pursuant to the
new amendment, the Attorney General was not required
to answer a claim unless he filed a counterclaim (a procedural provision continued in the rules of the present
Court of Claims).27 Where a special defense was alleged,
filing an answer became discretionary with the Attorney
General.2
It is evident that by this time, the Board of
Claims had gradually acquired many of the characteristics
and powers of a court.
In 1897, the Code of Civil Procedure was amended,
and the Board of Claims was made a court, endowed with
the powers necessary to carry on its judicial functions. 9
25

Laws of New York, 1896, ch. 451, changed the manner of taking an
appeal; thereafter, appeals in matters amounting to $500 or more were taken
to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Third Department.
26 Laws of New York, 1884, ch. 60.
27 N.Y. CT. CL. R. 13.
28 Laws of New York, 1888, ch. 365.
29 Laws of New York, 1897, ch. 36.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 40

The commissioners then in office were named Judges of the
Court of Claims. The powers of the Court were the same
as those of the Board of Claims, but with one limitationthe Court was deprived of jurisdiction of a claim submitted
by law to any other tribunal or officer for audit and determination. It was provided that where jurisdiction was
conferred on the Court by special law, liability was not
implied but was subject to a defense as if presented under
a general law. Judgments were to be entered upon the
decisions of the Court, and such judgments were res judicata.
In addition to making rules to regulate practice, the Court
could also vacate or modify judgments and grant new trials,
but no costs, fees, or disbursements were to be taxed or
allowed. Appeals from judgments or orders of the Court
lay to the Appellate Division, Third Department.
Subsequent amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure provided for the allowance of interest on the judgments of the Court of Claims, set up procedures to be
followed for the payment thereof by the State Comptroller,"
and granted the power to order interpleader, consolidate
claims or bring in new parties."' In 1906, Section 265
of the Code of Civil Procedure was amended to provide
that, except as otherwise prescribed, Court of Claims practice
should conform to that in the supreme court.
Two years later, the state waived a portion of its immunity, and jurisdiction was conferred on the -Court to
hear and determine claims of wrongful death caused by
the alleged tortious conduct of the state. The jurisdiction
of the Court was also expanded to include contract claims
which were rejected by an officer or tribunal to whom they
were submitted by law, and it was additionally provided
that no award should be made on any claim against the
30 Laws of New York, 1901, ch. 440.

$'Laws of New York, 1901, ch. 286. In 1905, an amendment to Section
264 of the Code of Civil Procedure required the consent of the Superintendent
of Public Works for the compromise of canal claims. Also, the filing of
a notice of intention within six months of the accrual of a claim was
required as a condition precedent in all claims except those for the appropriation of property. This amendment also served to reduce the statute of
limitations in claims other than appropriations from two years to six months.
Laws of New York, 1905, ch. 370.
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state except on such legal evidence as would establish
liability against an individual or corporation in a court
of law or equity. The same year provision was made for
an examination before trial by the Attorney General of
any claimant, and the Court was barred from hearing any
claim which as between citizens of the state would be barred
by a lapse of time.2 In 1910, former Section 176 of the
New York Highway Law was amended to render the state
liable for injuries resulting from a defect in a state or
county highway during the time the highways were maintained by the state's patrol system. 3
The Court of Claims was abolished in the following
year and was succeeded by the Board of Claims which consisted of three commissioners3
The constitutionality of
the act abolishing the Court of Claims was upheld by the
Court of Appeals3 0 on the ground that, since the Court
of Claims was not a court provided for in the state constitution, it was only an auditing board or quasi-judicial
body. This holding was contrary to a previous statement
by the same Court in Spencer v. State,"8 wherein it had
been recognized that the 1897 amendment to the Code of
Civil Procedure had "reorganized the former Board of
Claims into the Court of Claims and made the latter one
of the regular and important judicial tribunals of the
State." 7
The Board of Claims was abolished and the Court of
Claims re-established in 1915.8 The Court was composed of
three Judges who were required to be attorneys with a
minimum of ten years experience. Claims could be heard
Laws of New York, 1903, ch. 519.
Laws of New York, 1910, ch. 570. See Belair v. State, 212 App.
Div. 206, 208 N.Y. Supp. 470 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 241 N.Y. 552, 150 N.E. 551
(1925); Best v. State, 203 App. Div. 339, 197 N.Y. Supp. 69 (3d Dep't),
af'd, 236 N.Y. 662, 142 N.E. 325 (1922); Borden v. State, 113 Misc. 232,
184 N.Y. Supp. 285 (Ct. Cl. 1920). See also 1936 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65,
N.Y. LAW REVISION Comm'x REp. (Q) 945-74.
34 Laws of New York, 1911, ch. 856.
35 People ex rel. Swift v. Luce, 204 N.Y. 478, 97 N.E. 850 (1912).
The opinion herein contains an extended exposition of the early history of
the Court of Claims.
30 187 N.Y. 484, 80 N.E. 375 (1907).
37 Id. at 486, 80 N.E. at 376.
38 Laws of New York, 1915, ch. 1.
32
33
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by one, two, or three Judges, but determinations required
the concurrence of any two.
Between 1915 and 1920, several minor changes were
made in the Code of Civil Procedure which affected the
'Court of Claims: at least two Judges were to devote their
entire time to the determination of canal appropriation
claims; 11 the Attorney General was empowered to notice
claims for trial by serving notice of trial, and to examine
a claimant with respect to the title of property in appropriation cases; 40 authority was granted to dismiss
claims for lack of prosecution, and to restore them on
good cause shown; it was required that a claim set forth
items of damage, 1 and the Court was authorized to join
additional parties in appropriation claims where their appearance was necessary; 42 the necessity of filing a notice
of intention as a condition precedent to filing a claim was
eliminated; 11 and it was provided that appeals from claims
arising within the fourth department be taken to that
department."4
The year 1920 saw the enactment of the Civil Practice
Act, and, as part of this procedural reform, a separate
Court of Claims Act was provided. This essentially was a
re-enactment of the pertinent provisions of the former Code
of Civil Procedure. 5 In the same year, the Court of Appeals
held in Snaith v. State4 6 that despite the fact that Section
264 of the Code of Civil Procedure had conferred jurisdiction of the broadest character upon the Court of Claims,
it nevertheless did not constitute a concession of liability
on the part of the state or create a cause of action which
did not previously exist. Therefore, the claimant, who had
been injured when he tripped over a wire on the grounds
89 Laws of New York, 1916, ch. 343.
40 Laws of New York, 1917, ch. 669.
41 Laws of New York, 1919, ch. 157.
42Laws of New York, 1919, ch. 208.
43 Laws of New York, 1920, ch. 482.
-Laws of New York, 1919, ch. 481.
45 The only significant change was a provision for the suspension of
interest in appropriation claims when the claimant failed to file his claim
within six months of accrual.
46 227 N.Y. 405, 125 N.E. 841 (1920).
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of the state reservation at Niagara, could not enforce his
claim against the state.
In 1928, Governor Smith vetoed a large group of private
bills which would have enabled the Court of Claims to
hear and determine actions based on tort. In his veto
message, he recommended a general law granting access
to the Court of Claims to all tort claimants 7 Up to this
time, access to the Court for tort claims, except where
immunity had been specifically waived, was by means of
enabling act. The following year, the legislature harkened
to the admonitions of the Governor and enacted former
Section 12(a) of the Court of Claims Act,4" waiving the
historic immunity of the state in tort, and conferring jurisdiction upon the Court to hear and determine claims based
upon the misfeasance or negligence of officers or employees
of the state. The statute was a significant landmark, and
represented the culmination of one hundred years of slow
but steady progress. The scope of the Court's jurisdiction
47 "I have been studying claim bills of this kind for years.
They constitute one of the greatest problems and most unnecessary burdens placed
upon the Governor by the Legislature. The total amount involved in these
claims is enormous. This year approximately sixty of these bills were
left on the desk of the Governor when the Legislature adjourned. Almost
all of them are obviously introduced by legislators who have no idea of the
validity of the claims ....
I have now come to the conclusion that provision
to meet claims of this kind should be made by amendment to the General
Laws. . . . There is no reason why access to the Court of Claims should be
afforded only to a selected few people who have friends to draw special bills
for them and who are able to obtain support in the Legislature to pass them.
By disapproving these bills my chief purpose is to call attention to the need
of the adoption of a new policy in the hope that the next Legislature will
give serious attention to this matter and pass the necessary amendments
to the General Laws so that this subject may be handled in the future in a
logical, fair and orderly way, in place of the haphazard, careless and
discriminating procedure which has obtained up to this time." PuaLIC PAMs
OF GovmROR ALF=ED E. SmITiE 200-02 (1928).
48 Laws of New York, 1929, ch. 467. The new act created some procedural difficulty in that it required the service of a written claim or written
notice of intention to file a claim upon the Attorney General and the Superintendent of Public Works within sixty days after the alleged injury
occurred. In addition, when a notice was filed, it was necessary to file a
claim within two years after the event which caused the injury. This
conflicted with the existing six-month statute of limitations provided for in
former Section 15 of the Court of Claims Act. See Diamond v. State,
147 Misc. 706, 264 N.Y. Supp. 573 (Ct. Cl. 1933). See also 1936 N.Y. LEG.
Doc. No. 65, N.Y. LAW REvISION Comm'N Ri,. (Q) 983-91. This situation
was rectified by enactment of Laws of New York, 1936, ch. 775.
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was now practically complete with respect to actions against
the State of New York.
The present Court of Claims Act, promulgated in 1939,"
was a clarification and rearrangement of the former statute.
The Court was to be composed of five Judges, appointed
for terms of nine years. Under new section 8, the state
waived its immunity from liability and action and consented
to have the same determined in accordance with the rules
of law applied to actions between individuals or corporations
in the supreme court. The new waiver was somewhat
broader than its predecessor, in that the Court was given
jurisdiction of public as well as private claims."
A subsequent amendment enabled the Court to hear
claims based upon wrongful imprisonment where the claimant
was pardoned by the Governor on the grounds of innocence.5 1
In 1953, the waiver of immunity was expanded to include
torts of members of the organized militia and employees
of the Division of Military Affairs, in the operation and
maintenance of vehicles and aircraft utilized within the
scope of their duties.2 Seven years later, the state became
49 Laws of New York, 1939, ch. 860.
50
Village of Flower Hill v. State, 7 App. Div. 2d 940, 182 N.Y.S.2d
230 (3d Dep't 1959); Town of Vienna v. State, 203 Misc. 1053, 1059,
119 N.Y.S.2d 545, 551 (Ct. Cl. 1953). It had been formerly held in
Board of Supervisors v. State, 153 N.Y. 279, 47 N.E. 288 (1897) that
the Board of Claims did not have jurisdiction of public claims. See also
cases cited in the To=r of Vienna opinion.
51 Laws of New York, 1942, ch. 442. The section was amended by
Laws of New York, 1946, ch. 10, to permit filing by persons convicted before
April 13, 1942. However, no award has been made as yet by the Court
of Claims in a claim filed pursuant to this act. Campbell v. State, 186
Misc. 586, 62 N.Y.S.2d 638 (Ct Cl. 1946) in which an award was made
for an erroneous conviction and imprisonment for forgery, was filed pursuant
to a special enabling act (Laws of New York, 1946, ch. 1). In Hoffner
v. State, 207 Misc. 1070, 142 N.Y.S.2d 630 (Ct. Cl. 1955), an award was
made to the claimant, who was wrongfully convicted of murder and sentenced
to life imprisonment. This statute was filed pursuant to Laws of New
York, 1955, ch. 841. See also People v. Hoffner, 208 Misc. 117, 129 N.Y.S.2d
833 (Queens County Ct. 1952). In Butters v. State, 27 Misc. 2d 105, 213
N.Y.S.2d 781 (Ct. Cl. 1961), an award was made for an improper conviction, but claim was filed under an enabling act (Laws of New York, 1959,
ch. 804). On the necessity of a pardon, see Roberts v. State, 160 N.Y.
217, 54 N.E. 678 (1899).
See also People v. Larkman, 187 Misc. 135,
64 N.Y.S2d 277 (Erie County Ct. 1946).
52 Laws of New York; 1953, ch. 343.
In Newiadony v. State, 276
App. Div. 59, 93 N.Y.S.2d 24 (3d Dep't 1949), the appellate division held
the state not liable in a collision involving the claimant and a National
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susceptible to liability for torts arising out of the operation,
maintenance and control of armories used by the militia."
This extension of waiver was actually a codification of a
rule enunciated in Strassman v. State.4
The legislation having the greatest effect on the work
of the Court of Claims since the waiver of immunity in
1929 is present Section 30 of the Highway Law." This act
transferred the duty of procuring rights of way for state
highways from the Boards of Supervisors of the counties to
the Department of Public Works. Thereafter, the state
itself, through the Superintendent of Public Works, acquired
all land for the construction and reconstruction of state
highways by appropriation. The appropriation was effected
by filing a map and a description of the property in the
local county clerk's office. The owners of the property had
the right to file a claim for any damages in the Court of
Claims, if they could not agree upon valuation with the
Superintendent of Public Works.
As a result of the tremendous highway construction
program of New York State, more than sixty per cent of
the work of the Court now involves claims for the appropriation of such property. To handle this constantly expanding number of claims, the Court has been increased
from five to fourteen Judges. 6
Guard vehicle, on the ground that the waiver of immunity did not cover
torts of the National Guard. The waiver was limited, excepting use in
the active service of the state pursuant to §§ 5, 6, or 7 of the Military Law,
or where the accident happened under circumstances under which the United
States had assumed liability. Watson v. State, 5 Misc. 2d 868, 162 N.Y.S.2d
729 (Ct. Cl.), aff'd, 5 App. Div. 2d 39, 169 N.Y.S.2d 206 (3d Dep't
1957).
53 Laws of New York, 1960, ch. 214.
G4 3 Misc. 2d 723, 156 N.Y.S.2d 193 (Ct. Cl. 1956), aff'd, 6 App. Div.
2d 962,
176 N.Y.S.2d 702 (3d Dep't 1958).
5
Laws of New York, 1944, ch. 544.
G6 Laws of New York, 1946, ch. 335 (Judges increased to 6); Laws of
New York, 1956, ch. 881 (Judges increased to 8); Laws of New York,
1961, ch. 862 (Judges increased to 10); Laws of New York, 1962, ch. 247
(Judges increased to 12); Laws of New York, 1965, ch. 404 (Judges increased to 14). Comparing the latest COURT OF CrAims REmRT with
THE TxsTRExna ANuAL. REPORT AND ST DEs OF THE NEw Yoiuc
JUDICIAL COUNCIL shows the following differences for the period July 1,
1945 through June 30, 1946, as compared with the period July 1, 1964
through June 30, 1965:
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The year 1950 saw the culmination of the development
of the Court of Claims when, by vote of the people, the
There could no
Court became a constitutional Court."
had definitely
of
Claims
Court
longer be any doubt that the
become one of the "regular and important tribunals" of
New York State.
SCOPE OF JURISRICTION

The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is wholly statutory. It is set forth in the New York Court of Claims Act,
and in several appropriation statutes, and other legislative
enactments 5s which give the Court power to render money

1945-1946

Claims
Claims
Claims
Claims

filed ....................
pending ..............
in Court ............
disposed of .........

1964- 1965

Number

Valve

Number

245
306
560
123

$4,414,997.16
6,303,217.65
10,718,214.81
3,362,507.12

1477
3713
5190
1996

Valite
$189,259,587.68
3,072,259,882.12*
3,261,519,469.80"
316,889,995.83

in several claims appear exaggerated.
N.Y. JUDIcIAL CONFERENCE 196-99 (1965).
57 N.Y. CoxsT. art. VI, § 23 (re-enacted as N.Y. CoNST. art. VI, § 9,
adopted by the people on November 7, 1961, continued the Court of Claims
as a constitutional court). A constitutional Court of Claims, consisting of
judges appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the Senate,
was adopted by the Constitutional Convention of 1867. However, the article
containing this proposal was defeated by the people for other reasons. The
proposal was revived again in the Constitutional Commission of 1872, but
was defeated by a vote of the commission. The Judiciary Commission
of 1890 tabled a proposal to establish a constitutional Court of Claims.
A constitutional Court was proposed in the Constitutional Conventions of
1894 and 1915, but the proposition was not adopted. At the Judiciary Convention of 1921, inclusion of the Court of Claims in the Constitution was
considered at some length. However, the convention rejected the proposal,
and a judiciary article recommended by that convention which was adopted
in 1925, left to the legislature the power to create or abolish any Board or
Court of Claims. The Constitutional Convention of 1938 proposed a constitutional Court of Claims, but the judiciary article was defeated by the
people. Concurrent with the proposals for a constitutional Court of Claims
were proposals that the Court be merged with the supreme court or the
Court of Appeals. These proposals were made as long ago as 1883. BaEUER,
THE NEw Yoax STATE COURT OF CLAImS, ITS HISTORY, JURISDICTION AND
RFPORTS 31-37 (1959).
58 There are approximately eighteen statutes providing for procedures to
appropriate property. All of these confer jurisdiction on the Court of
Claims to hear and determine claims for the value of such property taken.
* Damages

demanded

TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
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judgments for injuries resulting from various acts of the

state.
Sr

Jurisdiction has also been granted to the Court

of Claims over certain public authorities."
N.Y. AGaic. & MxTs. LAW § 27; N.Y. CANAL LAW

§§ 1-0503, 676-a; N.Y. Coaanc. LAW § 21; N.Y.

§ 40;

N.Y. CONSERV.

LAW § 307;
N.Y. ExEcuT vE LAW §213; N.Y. H'wAY LAw §§29, 30, 347; N.Y.
MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 46; N.Y. MiL. LAW § 177; N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 401; N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW § 40; N.Y. STATE LAW § 59-b
(public defense); N.Y. TJNCONSoL. LAWS § 8205 (McKinney 1928) (grade
crossing elimination); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 1307 (McKinney 1936)
(flood control); N.Y. UNcONSOL. LAWS § 7702 (McKinney 1942) (property
for conveyance to United States); in addition thereto, the following sections
of the N.Y. PUB. AUT.H. LAW provide for the acquisition of property
for certain authorities by the Superintendent of Public Works: (Adirondack
Mountain Authority) N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAW § 106; (New York State
Thruway Authority) N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 358; (East Hudson Parkway
Authority) N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 457; (New York State Bridge Authority) N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW § 529; (Power Authority of the State of
New York) N.Y. PUB. AuTH. LAW § 1007-b; (New York State Atomic
Research and Development Authority) N.Y. PuB. AurTH. LAW § 1856.
69 N.Y. CANAL LAW § 85 (damage caused by termination of navigation
on canal, or transfer of such canal to the United States); N.Y. CANAL
Law § 120 (damage caused by use or management of canal). However, the
state is not liable for damages resulting from the navigation of canals.
N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 8 does not contravene this section. Penn No. 5, Inc.
v. State, 205 Misc. 18, 126 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Ct. Cl. 1953). The statute also
permits settlements not exceeding $500); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 14
(an action against an officer or employee of the State Health Department
acting in official capacity shall be brought and maintained in the Court of
Claims as an action against the state); N.Y. CoNsaav. LAw § 58 (damages
to private land caused by agents of the Conservation Department establishing
barrier zones for control of forest insects and forest tree diseases);
N.Y. CoxsERv. LAw §437(14) (damages caused by entry during survey
for water resources planning and development); N.Y. PUB. LANDS LAW
§ 6 (damages based on failure of title to land sold by state) ; N.Y. Coaanc.
LAw § 6-b (claim against Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, officer or
LAW

EDuc.

employee of state prison, reformatory or institution for criminally insane,

when acting within scope of duties, shall be brought and maintained in the
Court of Claims as action against the state); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW
§ 44 (action against Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, officer or employee
of Mental Hygiene Department, while acting in scope of official duties,
shall be brought as claim against the state in the Court of Claims):
N.Y. CoNsEav. LAW §§ 505, 507 (damages for cessation of water power);
N.Y. CONSERV. LAW § 518 (revocation of water power license); N.Y.
ABAND.
PROP. LAW § 215 (claim for value of escheated lands); N.Y.
MuNic. LAw §§ 231-33 (claim by county for proceeds of railroad taxes);
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 9129 (McKinney 1951) (when Civil Defense
takes private property for temporary or permanent use or for destruction
the property owner can file a claim with Court of Claims. The Presiding
Judge can refer the claim to an emergency referee, who shall have the
same power as the Court). One statute, N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 46,
precludes the Court of Claims from hearing the claim of a state employee
for statutory pay increase.
60Tort and contract claims: (Jones Beach Parkway Authority) N.Y.
PuB. AUTr. LAW § 163-a; (New York State Thruway Authority) N.Y.
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As we have already indicated, the legislature still
can and does pass special statutes conferring jurisdiction
upon the -Court to enable it to hear a specific claim. The
majority of these statutes are passed to overcome the failure
of the claimant to comply with the filing requirements of
the -Court of Claims Act." Another type of enabling act
is passed to recognize a moral obligation on the part of the
state. Here, one of the functions of the Court of Claims
is to determine whether
the particular claim belongs to a class concerning which the Legislature, in the exercise of a wide discretion, might reasonably say that
they are founded in equity and justice and involve a moral obligation
on the part of the State which it should satisfy. Otherwise,
62 the
enactment is an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power.
The development of the jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims was concurrent with the retreat of the state from
the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the growing recognition of the idea that a responsible sovereign should
grant compensation to a citizen it has wronged. Although
Section 8 of the New York Court of Claims Act is a broad
waiver of immunity, it is vague and, in a certain sense,
unrealistic, for it prescribes the same rule of law between the
state and an individual as that applied between individuals
or corporations in the supreme court. Since the sovereign
engages in many functions which no individual or corporation undertakes, the Court of Claims plays -the extremely
difficult role of applying, in the first instance, these ordinary
principles of common law to situations involving the diverse
activities of the state."
PuB. AUTH. LAW § 361-b; (Bethpage Park Authority) N.Y. PuB. Aurn.
LAW §212-a; (East Hudson Parkway Authority) N.Y. PuB. AUrm. LAw
§ 469-a. Tort claims only: (Saratoga Springs Authority) N.Y. PuB. AuTH.
LAW § 1607.
61 However, the legislature cannot subject the state to a longer statute
of limitations than that existing for the same cause of action between private
citizens. Homer Eng'r Co. v. State, 12 N.Y.2d 508, 191 N.E.2d 455,
240 N.Y.S.2d 973 (1963).
62 Farrington v. State, 248 N.Y. 112, 115, 161 N.E. 438, 440 (1928) ; see
also Ausable Chasm Co. v. State, 266 N.Y. 326, 194 N.E. 843 (1935).
63 See Herzog, Liability of the State of New York for "Purely Governmental" Functions, 10 Syacus L. Rnv. 30 (1958).
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There are two facets to the problem to be determined
by the Court. Since the State of New York delegates
some of its governmental powers to its political subdivisions,
and employs various agencies to perform certain of its
functions, the Court, in many cases, is called upon to decide
whether the State of New York is the actual defendant.
The other facet of the problem is to determine the limit
of the state's liability.
There are large areas of sovereign activity for which no liability
accrues against the State or the officers of the State in the performance
of official functions....

No government could function thus hedged

in by lawsuits.. . . There are some public functions which by their
nature could impose no liability even if all sovereign immunity were
fully waived.64
In Bernardine v. City of New York, 6" the Court of
Appeals held that the waiver of immunity did not subject
the state to liability for the wrongs of the officers or
employees of its civil subdivisions2 However, while the
state may not be liable for the acts of a municipal subdivision under the theory of delegation of a governmental
function, it may nevertheless be liable when it employs
a municipality or other agency to perform some act, or
where a local officer acts on behalf of the state.6" In such
situations, the Court of Claims must determine whether
the actual tort-feasor is in fact an agent of the state.
5 where the claimant was committed
Thus, in Paige v. State,"
to a privately-owned reformatory by a court of competent
64 Newiadony v. State, supra note 52, at 61-62, 93 N.Y.S.2d at 26-27.
65294
N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945).
66

In Lee v. Village of Sandy Hill, 40 N.Y. 442 (1869), municipal
corporations were held liable in tort for governmental as well as proprietary functions. The Court of Appeals overruled this opinion in Maxmilian
v. The Mayor, 62 N.Y. 160 (1875), holding that when a civil subdivision
of the state performed a governmental function through one of its agents,
such agent acted as a delegate of the state and not in behalf of the political
subdivision. Hence there was no liability because of the immunity of the
sovereign. The Bernardine case held that the waiver of immunity by the
state put an end to this fictitious doctrine. See discussion in Sofka v.
State,
07 202 Misc. 235, 115 N.Y.S.2d 421 (Ct C. 1952).
Maltby v. County of Westchester, 267 N.Y. 375, 196 N.E. 295

(1935).

68269

N.Y. 352, 199 N.E. 617 (1936).
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jurisdiction, the Court of Claims ruled that the negligence
of those in charge of the institution was a tort of the officers
and employees of the state. However, in an instance where
the claimant was injured while enrolled in an educational
institution operated by a local school board, but supported
by federal funds paid through the state, the state was
held not liable since it neither operated the course nor
employed the school board to do so. 9 A similar result
was reached in Hofka v. State, ° where the state was absolved
of any responsibility for injuries received by the claimant
in taking an agility test conducted by a municipal civil
service commission. It has been held that a physician
appointed by a Boxing Commission, a sheriff, and a district
attorney are not employees of the state for whose acts
the state may be responsible.7 1
We have already touched on the relationship of public
authorities to the state. The question of state responsibility
for the acts of such authorities has come under the scrutiny
of the courts, particularly the Court of Claims. The test
of the liability of the state for the acts of such public
agencies is usually whether the agency is a separate entity,
corporate and politic, from the State of New York."2
The question of the responsibility of the state for the
acts of its judicial officers has also come before the Court
of Claims. This is another field in which the state's waiver
69 Buck v. State, 198 Misc. 575, 96 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
70 Supra note 66.
71 With respect to the status of a sheriff, see Commisso v. Meeker, 8
N.Y.2d 109, 168 N.E.2d 365, 202 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1960), holding that even
the county is not liable in tort for the acts of the sheriff. See also.,
Fisher v. New York, 10 N.Y.2d 60, 176 N.E.2d 72, 217 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1961);
Rosensweig v. New York, 5 N.Y.2d 404, 158 N.F-2d 229, 185 N.Y.S.2d 521
(1959), affirming 5 App. Div. 2d 293, 171 N.Y.S.2d 912 (3d Dep't 1958),
reversing 208 Misc. 1065, 146 N.Y.S.2d 589 (Ct. Cl. 1955), wherein the
state was held liable on the ground that the type of control exercised by
the State Athletic Commission left no doubt that examining doctors were
its servants.
72Malone v. State, 1 N.Y.2d 837, 135 N.E.2d 724, 153 N.Y.S2d 219
(1956)
(River Regulating District); Breen v. Mortgage Comm'n, 285
N.Y. 125, 35 N.E.2d 25 (1941); Pantess v. Saratoga Springs Authority,
255 App. Div. 426, 8 N.Y.S.2d 103 (3d Dep't 1938); Braun v. State, 203
Misc. 563, 117 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Ct Cl. 1952) (Dormitory Authority of the
State of New York). The Court has exclusive jurisdiction of suits against
certain public authorities by legislative enactment.
See note 60 supra.
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of immunity has been held inapplicable, since a judicial
officer is not an employee of the state in the sense that

the doctrine of respondeat sperior can be logically applied
to his acts.73

Another situation involving the limits of the state's
liability is that of an act performed pursuant to legislative
policy, chiefly where such policy has concerned the protection of certain wild animals.

In

Barrett v. State,74

it was held that the state was not liable for the flooding
of the claimant's land as a result of beaver dams, constructed by beaver which were purchased, liberated and
protected by the state in pursuance of a legislative policy
to restore beaver to New York. The rationale of the
5
Barrett case was followed in Mann v. State,"
and Anthony
v. State97 which involved collisions of vehicles -with deer
on a state highway, and in Corron v. State,7 7 which con-

cerned damage to fruit trees by cottontail rabbits. However,
in Morrison v. State,7 another deer-collision case, the
Court held that the claim, alleging failure to erect and

maintain signs warning of deer crossings, contained facts
sufficient to state a cause of action, but the case was
ultimately dismissed on the ground that the absence of signs
was not a proximate cause.
It is generally held that the State of New York is
not liable under the waiver of immunity for errors of
73 jameison v. State, 4 Misc. 2d 326, 158 N.Y.S.2d 496 (Ct. Cl. 1956),
aff'd, 7 App. Div. 2d 944, 182 N.Y.S.2d 41 (3d Dep't 1959); Fishbein v.
State, 204 Misc. 151, 120 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Ct. Cl.), aff'd, 282 App. Div.
600, 125 N.Y.S.2d 845 (3d Dep't 1953). In Waterman v. State, 19 App.
Div. 2d 264, 241 N.Y.S.2d 314 (4th Dep't 1963), it was held that a court
stenographer was not a judicial officer. In fact, the court stated that the
responsibility of the state for his negligence, under the principle of respondeat
superior, presented a question of fact.
74 220 N.Y. 423, 116 N.E. 99 (1917).
7547 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Ct. Cl. 1944).
76204 Misc. 241, 122 N.Y.S.2d 830 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
77 170 Misc. 811, 10 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Ct. Cl. 1939).
78204 Misc. 222, 123 N.Y.S.2d 105 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
The Court stated,
by way of dicta, in Morrison that the erection or non-erection of a sign
to warn of deer was something in the nature of a quasi-judicial determination. However, see Hicks v. State, 4 N.Y.2d 1, 148 N.E.2d 885, 171
N.Y.S.2d 827 (1958), where the Court of Appeals stated that there is, of
course, no longer any question that the state is duty-bound to warn highway
users of existing hazards.
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judgment on the part of its officers. At times, the distinction between an error in judgment and common-law
negligence is a very fine one. In several instances it has
been held that the failure of the Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles to revoke a driver's license or a vehicle's registration
did not subject the state to liability for subsequent injuries
caused by the operation of such vehicle or the action of such
driver."9 As a practical matter, it is doubtful whether the
possession or non-possession of an operator's license or
certificate of registration could be said to have been the
proximate cause of the accident.
In Bertch 1). State," the state was held not liable where
the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles erroneously suspended
the claimant's license. Similarly, in Haslm v. State,8 1
the Court dismissed a claim based on the location of a
railroad warning signal, which had been placed pursuant
to the direction of the Public Service Commissioner. The
rationale in these cases was that the waiver of immunity
was never intended to redress individual wrongs which may
have resulted from the exercise of judgment and discretion
by a state official in the performance of his duty.2 " But
where injury resulted from an abuse of discretion, 3 administrative error or faulty interpretation of a statute, 4 liability
has been found to exist.
There has been some criticism of the decisions in the
"error in judgment cases," particularly of the results in
79 Granger v. State, 14 App. Div. 645, 218 N.Y.S.2d 742 (3d Dep't
1961); Brumby v. State, 14 Misc. 2d 592, 180 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Ct. Cl. 1958);
Craver v. State, 204 Misc. 214, 123 N.Y.S2d 58 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
80 193 Misc. 259, 83 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
81 167 Misc. 455, 4 N.Y.S.2d 59 (Ct. Cl. 1938).
See also Weiss v.
Fote,
7
N.Y.2d
579,
167
N.E.2d
63,
200
N.Y.S.2d
409
(1960).
8
2Instalment Dep't v. State, 21 App. Div. 2d 211, 250 N.Y.S.2d 124
(3d Dep't 1964); St. George v. State, 283 App. Div. 245, 127 N.Y.S2d
147 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 308 N.Y. 681, 124 N.E.2d 320 (1954); Rowe v. State,
206 Misc. 1035, 136 N.Y.S.2d 27 (Ct Cl. 1954).
83 Goergen v. State, 18 Misc. 2d 1085, 196 N.Y.S.2d 455
(Ct Cl.

1959).
84

Williams v. State, 5 App. Div. 2d 936, 172 N.Y.S.2d 206 (3d Dep't),
motion for leave to appeal denied, 4 N.Y.2d 678 (1958); Waterman v.
State, 1 App. Div. 2d 235, 149 N.Y.S.2d 381 (4th Dep't 1956), afg'd, 2
N.Y.2d 803, 140 N.E.2d 551, 159 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1957).
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H
fowever, the "error in judgment"
Bertch and Haslam.nY
type of claim involves certain complexities, and the initial
consideration is one of proximate causation8 6 The question
of foreseeability must also be examined. Overriding all,
of course, is the policy question: just what is the limit of
the state's responsibility to the individual citizen; how great
a burden can the state assume in protecting him? 7
The state's assumption of tort liability raised a
question as to whether the state and its political subdivisions would now be liable for failure to enforce statutes
and regulations, and to otherwise provide for public protection. The Court of Appeals provided a partial answer
to this question in Steitz v. City of Bea-con," holding that
the duty of public protection was owed to the community
in general 9 and that the failure to provide such protection
did not create civil liability to individuals.
The same principle has prevailed in the inspection
cases. For example, in Young v. State,r claimant, employed
under a city contract, fell from a scaffold which did not
comply with the safety provisions of the labor law. He
failed to prove that the state had any knowledge of the
violation or that it existed when the premises were inspected.

85 See Herzog, supra note 63, at 35-36. It is doubtful that Haslam would
be decided similarly today in view of the Court of Appeals' decisions in
the highway sign cases. Hicks v. State, 4 N.Y2d 1, 148 N.E.2d 885, 171
N.Y.S.2d 827 (1958); Nuss v. State, 301 N.Y. 768, 95 N.E.2d 822 (1950).
86 In Rowe v. State, supra note 82, the issuance of the license had no
positive effect on the claimant's injury, since there was no proof that the
licensee was not qualified to receive a license.
87 See Hidy v. State, 207 Misc. 207, 137 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Ct. Cl. 1955),
aff'd, 2 App. Div. 2d 644, 151 N.Y.S2d 621 (4th Dep't 1956), aff'd, 3
N.Y.2d 756, 143 N.E.2d 528, 163 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1957).
88 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945).
89 The same problem was recognized earlier in Hughes v. State, 252
App. Div. 263, 299 N.Y. Supp. 387 (3d Dep't 1937), and decided in a
similar manner. See also Miletits v. State, 204 Misc. 381, 123 N.Y.S.2d
586 (Ct. Cl. 1953), where the Court held that there was no duty on the
part of the State Rent Administrator to bring an action on behalf of a tenant
where the tenant elected not to institute an action.
11278 App. Div. 997, 105 N.Y.S.2d 657 (3d Dep't 1951), aff'd, 304 N.Y. 677,
107 N.E.2d 594 (1952).
See Horoch v. State, 6 App. Div. 2d 915, 176
N.Y.S.2d 181 (3d Dep't 1958); Heiston v. State, 18 Misc. 2d 296, 189
N.Y.S.2d 225 (Ct. CL 1959); Trzecieski v. State, 4 Misc. 2d 182, 158
N.Y.S.2d 277 (Ct. Cl. 1956), appeal dismissed, 5 App. Div. 2d 1053, 174
N.Y.S.2d 229 (4th Dep't 1958); Chastaine v. State, 160 Misc. 828, 290
N.Y. Supp. 789 (Ct C. 1936).
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He contended that the state was liable for its failure to
supervise the work and to enforce the safety provisions.
The Court of Claims held that neither the statute nor any
principle of the common law had placed so onerous and
general a burden upon the state.
In situations, however, where the state actually makes
an inspection, and negligently fails to discover a violation,
or neglects to have it corrected, there is liability.9 ' Thus,
while the state may not be liable for its failure to enforce
statutes generally, it is nevertheless guilty of common-law
negligence when it fails to take action under conditions
where it knew or should have known there was a violation
of the law. In Peterson v. State, 2 where the claimant's
vehicle collided with a disabled vehicle parked on a state
highway, the state was held liable, since the violation was
known by the state police, who failed to remove the vehicle
or to warn of its presence. In Lehman v. State," the state
was absolved of liability where the claim was based on the
state's failure to enclose or illuminate an area containing
broken high-tension lines. There, however, the claim was
dismissed because no act of the state was proven proximately
causative of the death of the claimant's intestate.
The "error in judgment," inspection, enforcement, and
protection claims all pose one common question, and that
is the limit of state liability. Obviously the duty to enforce
all laws, rules, and regulations, as well as to provide for
the common defense and protection, is an onerous one. If
the state were liable in money damages to each individual
for each breach of such duty, the burden would be appalling.
Hence, the courts have taken a pragmatic approach in
deciding these types of claims-they have attempted to
strike a balance between contending interests.
91 Synesael v. State, 21 Misc. 2d 234, 198 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Ct Cl. 1960);
Metildi v. State, 177 Misc. 179, 30 N.Y.S.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1941). See also
Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d
265 (1958).
92 37 Misc. 2d 931, 235 N.Y.S.2d 397 (Ct. C1. 1962), aff'd, 19 App. Div.
2d 860, 245 N.Y.S.2d 345 (4th Dep't), motion for leave to appeal denied,

13 N.Y.2d 599 (1963).
93279 App. Div. 950, 110 N.Y.S.2d 753 (3d Dep't 1952),
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Several cases have been brought in the Court of Claims
based on the actions of state officers for which statutory
review was provided by law. In this type of action, the
claim is dismissed, and the claimant is directed to seek
his statutory remedy, usually an Article 78 proceeding."
For example, civil service matters involving appointment
and discharge of state employees have been held to be the
subject of Article 78 proceedings, rather than claims in the
Court of Claims."
The Court has also considered the effect of the waiver
of immunity where a claim is based on a statutory cause
of action. Usually, general statutes in derogation of the
sovereignty of the state are strictly construed and do not
divest the state of its rights or interests, save by specific
provision or unmistakable legislative intent to that effect.9
Thus, where an action based on breach of a statutory duty
would lie between individuals, a claim against the state
must be based on negligence.97 However, in appraising
the negligence of the state, the standards it has created
for others by its statutes and rules may be properly
applied.9" In one case, the state was held liable for its
a' CPLR art. 78.

95 Burgos v. State, 40 Misc. 2d 971, 244 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Ct. Cl. 1963);
Reiser
v. State, 198 Misc. 647, 98 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
9
6Jewish Hosp. v. Doe, 252 App. Div. 581, 300 N.Y. Supp. 1111 (2d Dep't
1937); Denton v. State, 72 App. Div. 248, 76 N.Y. Supp. 167 (3d Dep't
1902).
97 Koenig v. Patrick Constr. Co., 298 N.Y. 313, 83 N.E.2d 133 (1948).
98 Gould v. State, 196 Misc. 488, 92 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Ct. Cl. 1949), wherein
the state was held negligent in failing to supply goggles to an inmate of a
state prison engaged in demolition work. Claimant had urged that the
state was under a positive duty to furnish goggles pursuant to N.Y. LAI.
LAw § 241 and Rule 23-3.18 of the Rm.zs RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF
PERSONS EMPLoYED IN THE ERECTION,

REPAIR AND DEMOUTION op BLDGS.

OR STRucTUREs, 3 N.Y. OFFIcIAL COMPILATION oF CODES, RULES & REGULATIONS

657 (1945). See Fitzgerald v. State, 28 Misc. 2d 283, 217 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Ct.
Cl. 1961); Lee v. State, 187 Misc. 268, 64 N.Y.S.2d 417 (Ct. Cl. 1946);
Beale v. State, 46 N.Y.S.2d 824 (Ct Cl. 1944). See also Coleman v.
State, 3 App. Div. 2d 802, 160 N.Y.S.2d 192 (3d Dep't 1957), where the
appellate division found it unnecessary to pass on the question of whether
the state was subject to the provisions of the labor law. In Moore v.
State, 42 Misc. 2d 314, 248 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Ct Cl. 1964), the Court held
that a provision of the Administrative Code of the City of New York
requiring owners of property to abate the public nuisance was not binding
on the State of New York, particularly in view of the fact that the thrust
of the local legislation was penal.
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negligence in failing to comply with the labor law and with
the rules of an administrative agency where a trench under
construction on state-owned property collapsed and killed
the claimant's intestate.9 The state was also held liable
under Section 51 of the Civil Rights Law, where it had
made unauthorized use of a picture of the claimant in
advertising a ski facility. The Court stated that the waiver
of immunity applied and that the claimant had a civil
action under the statute since the activity of the state
involved a kind of business that also engaged the attention
of private enterprise. The Court held, however, that
Section 50 of the Civil Rights Law, which was penal in
nature, did not apply to the state."'
One of the jurisdictional limits on the Court of Claims
is the lack of power to implead a third-party defendant.
While additional parties claimant may be interpleaded, a
third party who has no claim against the state, but against
whom the claimant may have a cause of action arising from
the same transaction, or who may be primarily liable, cannot be brought in by the court. 10' The reason is twofold:
first, the Court of Claims has jurisdiction solely of claims
against the state, by the state against a claimant, or between
conflicting claimants as the legislature may provide; secondly,
the additional defendant has a constitutional right to a
jury trial in a court of general jurisdiction, 0 2 and there
is no such right afforded by the Court of Olaims Act.1 03
Any attempt to subject persons not properly before it to
the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims would be uncon99

Mitchell v. State, 24 Misc. 2d 853, 203 N.Y.S.2d 770 (Ct Cf. 1960),

aff'd, 14 App. Div. 2d 478, 217 N.Y.S2d 641

(3d Dep't 1961).

See also

Janice v. State, 201 Misc. 915, 107 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Ct Cl. 1951), where
the state was held liable for breach of a nondelegable duty when a building,
in the process of demolition by a contractor in a state-owned public park,
collapsed and killed claimant's intestate.
100 Seidelman v. State, 202 Misc. 817, 110 N.Y.S2d 380 (Ct. Cl.
1952).
0

0' Horoch v. State, 286 App. Div. 303, 143 N.Y.S.2d 327 (3d Dep't
1955).
102 N.Y. CosT. art. I, § 2; art. VI, § 18.
103 N.Y. CONST. art VI, § 18(b); N.Y. CT. CL. Acr § 12(3).
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stitutional,0 4 and, therefore, a claimant having a cause
of action against a party jointly liable with the state must
sue such party in the supreme court.
Another jurisdictional problem of a similar nature
arises in appropriation claims, where there is an apparent
lien, encumbrance, dower or other interest which the Court
for any reason is unable to determine. Under Section 22
of the New York Court of Claims Act, unless the owners
of such interests consent that their respective rights be
determined by the Court, it shall order deposit of the award
for distribution to the persons entitled to the same as
ordered by the supreme court. The Court of 'Olaims may
order interpleader of all parties, known or unknown, for a
complete determination of the action."0 5 This, of course,
is to protect the state against further claims arising from
the same appropriation. The Court may determine title
questions between the state and the claimant,1°° and may
decide that where the interests of the parties are undisputed
there is no need for a deposit of the award. 0 7 However,
where there is an actual dispute between conflicting interests,
104 See Horoch v. State, supra note 101. During the court reorganization
hearings in the late 1950's, proponents of consolidation of the Court of
Claims and the supreme court made considerable point of this jurisdictional
difficulty, urging that consolidation would eliminate separate trials in joint
tort-feasor cases, "claim over" cases, and other cases where liability of both
the state and another party in a claim against the state is involved. See
1957 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 88, SECOND ANNuAL REPOR OF TE JUDICIAL
CoNrmmc 101. Since there was no intent or serious proposal that the
state subject itself to jury trials, consolidation would not be a complete
solution. Studies made at the time indicated that the problem was actually
a minor one, the importance of which had been greatly exaggerated. A
survey of the calendar calls of the Court of Claims for the year 1955
indicated only eleven out of 1,508 cases on the calendar of the Court for
that year involved instances where another action was pending in the
supreme court on the same set of facts. A survey made of decisions
in which awards were made in personal injury and death claims between
1940 and 1955 revealed that out of 599 such claims, there were only twelve
instances where a claimant had settled with a joint tort-feasor in the
supreme court before trying his case in the Court of Claims.
205 N.Y. Cr. CL. ACT § 9(6).
106 People ex rel. Palmer v. Travis, 223 N.Y. 150, 119 N.E. 437 (1918).
107 East River Savings Bank v. State, 266 App. Div. 494, 43 N.Y.S.2d
703 (3d Dep't 1943).
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the Court does not have jurisdiction unless the parties
waive their constitutional right to a jury trial.1 08
In considering the general jurisdiction of the ,Court of
Claims and the problems incident thereto, we have found
that although it is couched in rather broad terms, there
are certain necessary limitations thereon because of the
nature of the sovereign and the guarantees of the constitution. Hence, the Court of Claims plays a prime role
not only in determining liability and damages in a specific
case, but also in defining the ambit of the state's liability.
IAJOR

CATEGORIES

OF CLAIMS

Having discussed the jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims, we shall proceed to consider the work of the Court
in relation to the type of claims it ordinarily hears and
determines. They fall into three general categories: appropriation, tort, and contract.
Appropriation Claims
The State of New York exercises its power of eminent
domain administratively. We have already enumerated the
several statutes 109 setting forth procedures by which the
state may acquire private property through the exercise of
such power. The statutes are all quite similar, in that
the actual taking of the property is effected by filing a
map and a description of the property taken in the local
county clerk's office. The claimant is divested of his
property, and title passes to the State of New York upon
the performance of this act. The owner has the choice of
08

In Solkat Realty v. State, 174 Misc. 808, 21 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Ct. Cl.

1940), aff'd, 262 App. Div. 944, 29 N.Y.S.2d 622 (4th Dep't 1941), aff'd,
288 N.Y. 547, 42 N.E2d 13 (1942), the trial court expressed the hope
that the appellate division, in reviewing the decision, would answer the
question whether the court had any jurisdiction to determine title as between
conflicting interests without the consent of the parties concerned and,
expressed the belief that it might determine issues of title in disputed
ownership of land only by consent of the interested parties. The appellate
division did not answer the question proposed by the trial court. See
Abraham v. State, 31 Misc. 2d 252, 223 N.Y.S.2d 826 (Ct Cl. 1962);
Moroney v. State, 67 Misc. 58, 124 N.Y. Supp. 824 (Ct Cl. 1910).
109 See note 58

=pra.

1965 ]

COURT OF CLAIMS

agreeing with the state on a price for his property or
filing a claim in the Court of Claims. Such claim must
be filed within two years after he is served a copy of the
map and description with notice of their filing.11
There are more appropriation claims filed than any
other type."' This is not surprising in view of the fact
that the State of New York has been appropriating all
the real property it needs not only for its extensive highway
construction program, but also for the needs of several
of its public authorities. It is essential that these claims be
disposed of as quickly as possible, since they bear interest
from the date of taking and excessive delays cost the state
large sums in interest payments." 2 The claimant may also
suffer an economic loss if he has to wait for compensation,
for he may have to borrow money to replace the appropriated property, and the rate of interest he pays on such
borrowing is usually higher than the four per cent rate
paid by the state.
To facilitate the prompt disposal of these actions, the
Judges of the ,Court of Claims have undertaken additional
assignments, and special terms have been set up in areas
where there are backlogs of appropriation claims.1 3 In
addition, the Court now exercises stricter calendar control,
and has been able to conduct pretrial conferences in all
the districts with a view to settling appropriation claims.
Since the Court operates on the state level, and its
work is closely connected with that of the Attorney General
110 N.Y. CT. CL Acr § 10(1).
"I In the period July 1, 1964 through June 30, 1965, the Court disposed
of 1,996 claims, of which 1,337 were appropriation claims. During the same
period, 1,477 claims were filed, of which 884 were appropriation claims.
Spokesmen for the Department of Public Works state that approximately
eighty per cent of the appropriation claims are settled before a formal
claim is filed with the Court of Claims. Thus, the claims filed represent
the hard core of appropriation matters which the state's agents have not
been able to settle amicably.
112 At present, a special committee appointed by the governor is at work
reviewing the state's laws and administrative procedures for the taking of
real property and compensating owners. The chairman of this committee is
a former Presiding Judge of the Court of Claims, and one Judge of the
Court of Claims is a member of the committee.
113 See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CouRT OF CLAIMs TO THE Gova 0R
(1963).
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and the Department of Public Works, there is an identity
of administrative problems in many areas. As a result of
a series of conferences between members of the Court and
representatives of such offices, measures have been taken
to further facilitate disposal of appropriation matters. One
such measure was the installment of a simple procedure
for payments by the Comptroller in cases where the Court
recommends settlement. Adoption of this procedure has
eliminated the time-consuming method of settling matters
through formal proof and entry of judgment in such
situations.
The New York State Constitution provides: "Private
property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation." 114 The function of the Court of Claims
in an appropriation matter is to determine the sum of
money which will fairly compensate the claimant for the
loss of his property. Essential to all appropriation claims
is the testimony of an expert appraiser on market value,
which is generally the criterion of just compensation. 15
It is apparent, however, that in some instances the
expert appraiser has become an advocate, and the all-tooprevalent practice of exaggerated appraisals has placed a
burden on the Court in the performance of its duty to
arrive at a just award for the value of the appropriated
property. This practice has caused great concern not only
to the Court, but also to the professional appraisal societies,
which have been attempting to rectify the situation."' The
114N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, §7(a).
See also U.S. CoNsT. amend. V, which
provides in part "nor shall private property be taken for public use without

just compensation. ..

'

115 United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946).
"The Constitution and the statutes do not define the meaning of just
compensation. But it has come to be recognized that just compensation is
the value of the interest taken. This is not the value to the owner for his
particular purposes but a so-called 'market value.' It is recognized that
an owner often receives less than the value of the property to him but
experience has shown that the rule is reasonably satisfactory." Id. at 377.
116 The American Institute of Appraisers has an appraisal review committee. In a situation where members of the Institute oppose each other
in a case, both members must file a report with the Institute indicating
what their value was and who opposed them. If there was a very substantial divergence in their values, the local chapter of the Institute investigates and reports. Flagrant violation of the rules of ethics of the
society can result in expulsion.
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Department of Public Works has also been making an
intensive effort to upgrade the quality of the state's appraisals, in an attempt to improve the accuracy of its
value testimony.
Of basic importance to any appraisal is the inclusion
of compensable items which affect the value of the property
and, conversely, the elimination of non-compensable items.
There are many factors which a private investor may
possibly consider, but which must be excluded from the
consideration of the Court in an appropriation matter.""
For example, the amount of traffic passing the premises,"'
the visibility of the property from a public road,119 or the
convenience of access... cannot be considered when the
Court is assessing consequential damages, although such
factors may have a considerable effect on the market value
of the property.' 2 '
One whose land is appropriated is entitled to receive
the greatest value for any available use to which it may
'117 "Again, strict adherence to the criterion of market value may involve
inclusion of elements which, though they effect such value, must in fairness
be eliminated in a condemnation case, as where the formula is attempted
to be applied as between an owner who may not want to part with his land
because of its special adaptability to his own use, and a taker who needs
the land because of its peculiar fitness for the taker's purposes. These
elements must be disregarded by the fact-finding body in arriving at 'fair'
market value." United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 375 (1942).

I1s McHale v. State, 278 App. Div. 886, 104 N.Y.S.2d 981 (4th Dep't
1951), aff'd, 304 N.Y. 674, 107 N.E.2d 593 (1952).
119 A. E. Nettleton Co. v. State, 11 App. Div. 2d 899, 202 N.Y.S.2d 102
(4th Dep't 1960).
120 Cf. Holmes v. State, 279 App. Div. 489, 111 N.Y.S.2d 634 (3d Dep't
1952).
' 21 The capitalization of profits is used as a basis of appraisal in many
instances for private purposes, but the use of this method is generally limited
to rental property in appropriation cases, and then only where there is some
valid basis for ascertaining the rental income. See Humble Oil & Ref.
Co. v. State, 12 N.Y.2d 861, 187 N.E.2d 791, 237 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1962);
Mattydale Shopping Center v. State, 303 N.Y. 974, 106 N.E.2d 59 (1952);
Levitin v. State, 12 App. Div. 2d 6, 207 N.Y.S.2d 798 (3d Dep't 1960).
Reproduction costs cannot be used as the sole basis for the valuation of improvements where such improvements are not a specialty. Guthnuller v.
State, 23 App. Div. 2d 597, 256 N.Y.S.2d 526 (3d Dep't 1965). The effect
of the probability of a zoning change may be considered and an increment
of value, based upon such probability, may be added to the total appraised
value. Masten v. State, 11 App. Div. 2d 370, 206 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dep't
1960), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 796, 175 N.E.2d 166, 215 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1961);
Valley Stream Lawns v. State, 9 App. Div. 2d 149, 192 N.Y.S.2d 805 (3d
Dep't 1959).
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be put. "Care must be taken, however, not to substitute
for reality the mere hope of the owner that the property
might be used for some specific purpose." '122 Although
property is valued as of the date of the taking, a potential
use may be shown, provided such use is in the realm of
Thus, the Court may give raw acreage an
feasibility.1 2
additional increment of value because of the potentiality of
its development as a subdivision,' and a plant or factory
may be valued as a unit of a going concern."
In an appropriation claim, it is not the duty of the
state to furnish the claimant with equivalent facilities or
the price thereof, but to pay just compensation for the land
However, in situtaken and the improvements thereon."
ations involving only a partial taking, the claimant may be
entitled to the expenses incurred in constructing equivalent
or alternate facilities so he may continue to fully utilize
the remaining property."
The important question of access 128 arises where state
road construction has effected a change in grading. In the
absence of statutory authority conferring the right to compensation, 9 an abutting owner may not recover for impairment of his right to the easements of light, air and
If there is an
access as the result of such change. 3
existing statute providing for damages, the state must pay
for making a change of grade which would be compensable
122 Matter of City of Rochester, 234 App. Div. 583, 586, 255 N.Y. Supp.
801, 806 (4th Dep't 1932).
123 St Agnes Cemetery v. State, 3 N.Y.2d 37, 143 N.E.2d 377, 163 N.Y.S2d
655 (1957).
124 Hewitt v. State, 18 App. Div. 2d 1128, 239 N.Y.S2d 864 (4th Dep't
1963).
125 Glen & Mohawk Milk Assn v. State, 207 Misc. 1130, 143 N.Y.S.2d
125 (Ct. Cl. 1955), aff'd, 2 App. Div. 2d 95, !153 N.Y.S.2d 725 (3d Dep't
1956).
126Abe Cooper-Syracuse Inc. v. State, 8 App. Div. 2d 578, 579, 183
N.Y.S.2d 220, 221 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 6 N.Y2d 964, 161 N.E.2d 390, 191
N.Y.S2d 164 (1959).
127 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. State, 279 App. Div. 692, 107 N.Y.S.2d 934
(3d Dep't 1951); Muncy v. State, 11 Misc. 2d 829, 174 N.Y.S.2d 440 (Ct.
Cl. 1958).
oN EMINENT
228 See Sackman, Access-A Problem in Liability, IxsTirru
DomAiN 1 (1962).
12See N.Y. SFcoiw CLAss Cirs LAw § 99; N.Y. VmUAG LAw § 159.
130 Radcliff's Ex'rs v. Mayor of B'klyn, 4 N.Y. 195 (1850).
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if performed by the municipality in which the property
is located. 3 ' Where any part of the claimant's property is
used to effectuate a change of grade, consequential damages
flowing from such a use are compensable-these damages
may include impairment of the right of access."' Moreover,
an owner may never be deprived of all access to a highway
without compensation.' 3'
Implicit in these access cases is the idea that there is
a definite limit to governmental liability even in appropriation claims. There is no doubt that even though there
be no direct taking, many claimants suffer actual loss for
which they remain uncompensated." 4 Although the specific
basis for the denial of relief may be a lack of statutory
authority, or a use of police power, the underlying philosophy of the decisions indicates that the fundamental
reason for such a denial is actually the inability of the
state to compensate for all possible damages. The opinion
in a recent case sets forth the idea succinctly: "The rights
of an abutting owner are subordinate to those of the State
in the regulation of public highways for the benefit of the
public, and any inconvenience must be borne by adjoining
landowners." 15 Since the burden placed upon the sovereign
in such situations would apparently be too great, the courts
have refused to compensate in the absence of a legislative
mandate to d so."'
1'1 Mirro v. State, 260 App. Div. 525, 23 N.Y.S.2d 852 (3d Dep't 1940),
aff'd, 285 N.Y. 678, 34 N.E.2d 378 (1941), City; Knights v. State, 161

Misc. 552, 291 N.Y. Supp. 567 (Ct. Cl. 1936), aff'd, 251 App. Div. 781,
298 N.Y. Supp. 173 (4th Dep't), motion for leave to appeal denied,

275 N.Y. 650 (1937), Village.
132 South Buffalo Ry. v. Kirkover, 176 N.Y. 301, 68 N.E. 366 (1903);
Comstok Foods v. State, 18 Misc. 2d 519, 191 N.Y.S.2d 448 (Ct Cl.
1959), aff'd, 11 App. Div. 2d 753, 204 N.Y.S.2d 125 (4th Dep't 1960);
Hartman v. State, 5 Misc. 2d 636, 161 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
133 Egerer v. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R., 130 N.Y. 108, 29
N.E. 95 (1891); Nash v. State, 21 App. Div. 2d 736, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (4th
Dep't 1964).
'34

See, e.g., Selig v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 59, 217 N.Y.S.2d

33 (1961); Northern Lights Shopping Center v. State, 20 App. Div. 2d
415, 247 N.Y.S.2d 333 (4th Dep't 1964), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 688, 204 N.E.2d 205,

256 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1965).
'35 Northern Lights Shopping Center v. State, supra note 134, at 419,
247 N.Y.S.2d at 337.
136 See Nash v. State, 21 App. Div. 2d 736, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (4th
Dep't 1964); Bennett v. State, 284 App. Div. 828, 132 N.Y.S.2d 388 (4th
Dep't 1954).
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The foregoing situations present but a few of the legal
questions raised in the trials of appropriation claims, but
they- are typical of the complexities involved in determining
valuation in eminent domain cases.
Tort Claims
Claims arising out of the negligent construction and
maintenance of the state highway system constitute the
largest single category of tort actions.'3 ' In the past few
decades, the Court of Claims has applied the rules of
common-law negligence to claims based on defective highways and, as a result, a body of law has been established
governing the duty of the state with respect to the traveling
public.'
Thus, the usual problem of the Court in highway
"37 Although most of the tort claims brought before the Court are based
on negligence, the Court also hands a considerable number of actions based
on intentional torts: false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution,
assault, and trespass.
138 The Court has held that highway construction must conform to the
engineering standards existing at the time of such construction. See
White v. State, 18 Misc. 2d 441, 445, 188 N.Y.S.2d 865, 869 (Ct. Cl. 1959);
cf. Barrett v. State, 22 App. Div. 2d 347, 256 N.Y.S.2d 261 (4th Dep't
1965). The state must erect and maintain adequate signs to warn of known
The
dangers. Canepa v. State, 306 N.Y. 272, 117 N.E.2d 550 (1954).
signs should conform to national standards. Ziehm v. State, 270 App. Div.
876, 61 N.Y.S.2d 99 (4th Dep't 1946). The state is usually not liable for
highway conditions due to the weather. McCauley v. State, 8 N.Y.2d 938,
168 N.E.2d 843, 204 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1960); La Tournerie v. State, 1 App.
Div. 2d 734, 147 N.Y.S.2d 138 (3d Dep't 1955); Sutherland v. State, 189
Misc. 953, 68 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Ct. Cl. 1947). However, the state is usually liable
where there is ice on the road as the result of faulty drainage. When such a
dangerous condition exists, it is the duty of the state to correct the condition, if
possible and, if not, to place signs warning of the danger or to sand the area.
Bono v. State, 1 N.Y.2d 885, 136 N.E.2d 715, 154 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1956) ; Crofut
v. State, 285 App. Div. 1201, 140 N.Y.S.2d 568 (3d Dep't 1955); Mercurio
v. State, 33 Misc. 2d 729, 227 N.Y.S.2d 372 (Ct. C1. 1962). However,
where a sanding truck runs out of sand during a storm, therle is no duty
to post signs indicating termination of sanding. Porcaro v. State, 16 App.
Div. 2d 1020, 229 N.Y.S.2d 499 (3d Dep't 1962), aff'd, 13 N.Y.2d 655,
The state may be liable for
191 N.E.2d 466, 240 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1963).
defective guard rails or for failure to erect guard rails. Falkowski v.
State, 26 Misc. 2d 367, 210 N.Y.S2d 268 (Ct C. 1961), aft'd, 15 App.
Div. 2d 717, 223 N.Y.S.2d 833 (3d Dep't 1962); Sanders v. State, 191
Misc. 248, 76 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Ct Cl. 1947), af'd, 274 App. Div. 842, 81
N.Y.S.2d 924 (4th Dep't 1948), aff'd, 298 N.Y. 850, 84 N.E.2d 151 (1949).
There is no duty to place guard rails where there is no foreseeable hazard.
Jacobs v. State, 198 Misc. 406, 98 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Ct C. 1950). The state
has been held liable for injuries resulting from the presence of rocks or
other debris on the road (Juliano v. State, 190 Misc. 180, 71 N.Y.S.2d
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negligence claims is merely the resolution of the facts (which
are usually in sharp dispute) and the application of the
established principles of law thereto. As in all negligence
cases, the contributory negligence of the claimant is
considered.
Another fertile source of negligence claims is the operation of custodial institutions for the mentally disturbed
and the retarded. The state is under a duty to care for
and protect the inmates of its mental institutions from
themselves and from each other. The usual cases involve
suicide, assault, and escape,'3 9 and basic to liability in this
type of action is notice to the state of the inmate's proclivities. Thus, in the case where a mentally retarded infant,
who was a known eloper, escaped from a state school
and set fire to a lumber yard, the state was absolved from
liability on the ground that such an event was not foreseeable, since the infant had never evinced any tendency
toward arson. 4 ' However, where an escapee from a mental
institution, who was known to be dangerous, stabbed the
claimant, the state was held liable.'
474 (Ct. Cl. 1947), aff'd, 273 App. Div. 936, 77 N.Y.S2d 826 (3d Dep't
1948); Jacobs v. State, 177 Misc. 70, 29 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Ct Cl. 1941),
aff'd, 263 App. Div. 1047, 33 N.Y.S.2d 692 (3d Dep't 1942)), where
the highway was more slippery than usual when wet (Stern v. State,
32 Misc. 2d 357, 224 N.Y.S.2d 126' (Ct. Cl. 1962), aff'd, 18 App. Div. 2d
1115, 239 N.Y.S.2d 322 (3d Dep't 1963)), and where there were holes in
the pavement (Miner v. State, 196 Misc. 752, 92 N.Y.S.2d 562 (Ct. Cl.
1949), aff'd, 277 App. Div. 921, 98 N.Y.S.2d 462 (3d Dep't 1950)).
Shoulders of a highway must be maintained in a condition so as to be
reasonably safe for use in case of an emergency. See Gruneison v.
State, 14 Misc. 2d 373, 179 N.Y.S.2d 682 (Ct. Cl. 1958) and cases cited
therein. With respect to objects on the shoulders see Ellis v. State,
16 App. Div. 2d 727, 226 N.Y.S.2d 803 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d
770, 186 N.E.2d 566, 234 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1962); Sweet v. State, 195 Misc.
494, 89 N.Y.S.2d 506 (Ct. C1. 1949), holding the state not liable for poles
properly placed in highway shoulder pursuant to statutory right, and
located to avoid unreasonable and unnecessary danger to travelers on the
highway.
19 Scolavino v. State, 297 N.Y. 460, 74 N.E.2d 174 (1947), assault by
a fellow inmate; Liddie v. State, 190 Misc. 347, 75 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Ct Cl.
1947), suicide; Burtman v. State, 188 Misc. 153, 67 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Ct Cl.
1947); Shattuck v. State, 166 Misc. 271, 2 N.Y.S2d 353 (Ct. Cl. 1938),
aft'd, 254 App. Div. 926, 5 N.Y.S.2d 812 (4th Dep't 1948), escape.
140Excelsior Ins. Co. v. State, 296 N.Y. 40, 69 N.E.2d 553 (1946).
'4' Weihs v. State, 267 App. Div. 233, 45 N.Y.S2d 542 (3d Dep't 1943);
Finkel v. State, 37 Misc. 2d 757, 237 N.Y.S.2d 66 (Ct. Cl. 1962). The
inmates of the state mental hospitals can, and do, suffer injuries in the
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The rule that has been enunciated in decisions involving
mental hospital claims absolves the state from liability
where injury results from an erroneous exercise of medical
judgment." 2 The state has been held liable, however, where
actual malpractice, as distinguished from an error in judgment, was the cause of the claimant's injury."
In an action for the wrongful death of an inmate of
a mental institution, the possibility of the inmate's recovery
and eventual return to society is an important factor in the
assessment of damages. Where there is no possibility of
such a recovery, there can be no allowance of damages for
death, except for funeral expenses.'"
A considerable number of claims arise out of the
operation of state prisons. These are usually for injuries
suffered by a prisoner working with allegedly defective
machines." 5 The state is obliged to furnish a prisoner with
a safe place to work, 4" and since he has no choice except
to do as directed, he cannot be held to assume the risks
ordinary course of events at such institutions, and claims are filed as a
result thereof. In such situations, the usual rules of negligence apply.
Hoyt v. State, 17 Misc. 2d 939, 188 N.Y.S.2d 223 (Ct. Cf. 1959); Reyes
v. State, 9 Misc. 2d 808, 170 N.Y.S.2d 633 (Ct. Cl. 1958); McCabe v.
State, 190 Misc. 11, 73 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Ct. Cl. 1947), aff'd, 273 App.
Div. 1048, 78 N.Y.S.2d 687 (3d Dep't 1948); Lee v. State, 187 Misc. 268,
64 N.Y.S.2d 417 (Ct. Cl. 1946).
142 St. George v. State, 308 N.Y. 681, 124 N.E.2d 320 (1954); Taig v.
State, 19 App. Div. 2d 182, 241 N.Y.S.2d 495 (3d Dep't 1963); see also
Seavy v. State, 21 App. Div. 2d 445, 250 N.Y.S.2d 877 (4th Dep't 1964),
absolving the state from liability where a released retarded infant burned
down claimant's barn. Basis of the decision was error in professional
judgment in use of the "open door" policy for rehabilitation of the
mentally retarded. But see Higgins v. State, 43 Misc. 2d 793, 252 N.Y.S.2d
163 (Ct Cf. 1964), where the state was held liable for permitting an
inmate of a mental hospital to leave the grounds and assault the claimant;
Foxluger v. State, 23 Misc. 2d 933, 203 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Ct. CI. 1960).
'"43Kaplan v. State, 198 Misc. 62, 95 N.Y.S.2d 890 (Ct. C1. 1950), aff'd,
277 App. Div. 1065, 100 N.Y.S.2d 693 (3d Dep't 1950).
144 Grasso v. State, 289 N.Y. 552, 43 N.E.2d 530 (1942); St. Pierre v.
State, 272 App. Div. 973, 71 N.Y.S.2d 608 (3d Dep't 1947). But see
Liddie v. State, supra note 139, where an award was made because of the
existence of workmen's compensation payments which would be made to next
of kin during the lifetime of the deceased inmate.
145See McCarthy v. State, 3 App. Div. 2d 644, 158 N.Y.S2d 1 (4th
Dep't 1956); Colley v. State, 2 Misc. 2d 545, 152 N.Y.S.2d 968 (Ct Cl.
1956).
14'See Webb v. State, 286 App. Div. 945, 142 N.Y.S.2d 855 (4th Dep't
1955), aft'd, 3 N.Y.2d 948, 146 N.E.2d 285, 168 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1957);
Shulenberg v. State, 35 Misc. 2d 751, 231 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Ct Cl. 1962).
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incident to his assigned job; .. he can, however, be guilty
of contributory negligence. 48 Several claims have involved
the question of the applicability of the provisions of the
state labor law dealing with protective devices. The Court
of Claims has held that, although such provisions may not
be binding on the state, they do set a standard for appraising the negligence of the state. 49
In claims involving state prisons, as in the mental
institution cases, the liability of the state is limited to
those injuries which might reasonably be foreseen. 1 0 Thus,
where a prisoner escaped from a prison farm and assaulted
the claimant's intestate, the state was absolved of liability,
since the escapee did not have a record of violence, having
been sentenced for committing a robbery with a toy pistol.
The Court of Appeals specifically stated that public policy
required that the state be held free of liability. It pointed
out that to hold otherwise would impose a heavy responsibility on the state and would dissuade prison authorities
from continued experimentation with minimum security
work details which prepare the better risk prisoner for
eventual return to society. Here, the Court placed a
limit on the state's liability on the ground that not to do
so might seriously interfere with the performance of governmental functions by responsible officials.'
The operation and maintenance of the state's system
of parks and recreational facilities is another fruitful source
of claims. While the state must generally oversee its parks
and recreational areas, it is not usually required to furnish
147Melton v. State, 198 Misc. 654, 99 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
'4s Richards v. State, 205 Misc. 3, 127 N.Y.S.2d
14 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
There is a limitation on actions brought by prison inmates. A prisoner
cannot file a claim as long as he is confined, since his civil rights are
suspended (Green v. State, 278 N.Y. 15, 14 N.E.2d 833 (1938)). However, a parolee (Grant v. State, 192 Misc. 45, 77 N.Y.S.2d 756 (Ct. Cl.
1948)) or an inmate of a reformatory (Foster v. State, 205 Misc. 736, 129
N.Y.S.2d 418 (Ct Cf. 1954)) may maintain an action.
'49 Gould v. State, 196 Misc. 488, 92 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Ct. Cl. 1949).
150 Mobley v. State, 1 App. Div. 2d 731, 147 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dep't
1955). Where one prisoner is assaulted by another, the state is not
liable unless it has knowledge that the prisoner committing the assault was
so much more dangerous than the others that it was improper to allow him
to perform ordinary tasks or mingle with other prisoners.
'1 Williams v. State, 308 N.Y. 548, 127 N.E.2d 545 (1955).
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direct and immediate supervision."' For example, failure
to enforce park regulations in the absence of notice of a
violation does not give rise to liability." 3
The most significant case arising out of the operation
of state parks was Battalla v. State." 4 In that case, an
infant was placed in the chair lift at Bellayre Mountain Ski
Center by an employee of the state, who neglected to secure
the safety bar of the chair. As a result of this negligent
act, claimant alleged she was frightened to such an extent
that she became hysterical and sustained severe emotional
and neurological disturbances with residual physical manifestations. The Court of Claims held that the complaint
alleged facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
In affirming, the Court of Appeals directly overruled prior
case law,'55 and rendered a significant change in the law
of damages in New York State.
The operation of the barge canal system was at one
time a prolific source of claims against the state. However, in recent years, there have been but few claims arising
out of this activity. Certain of these claims were based
on the use of the canal facilities, and the question usually
was whether the injured party had been a trespasser, a
licensee, or an invitee.'5 6 The greatest number of recent
canal cases have arisen out of the flooding of adjacent lands
through the operation of the canal. These claims usually
involve only property damage, but since many owners are
ordinarily damaged by one flooding, the practice in claims
of this sort is to try a test case which will govern disposition
of the remainder of the group.
A considerable number of claims have been filed alleging
flood damage due to negligent construction or maintenance
152Zarillo

v. State, 8 App. Div. 2d 651, 185 N.Y.S.2d 101 (3d Dep't

1956), aff'd, 7 N.Y.2d 943, 165 N.E.2d 877, 198 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1960).
153 Blank v. State, 19 Misc. 2d 585, 193 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Ct. C1. 1959).
154 17 Misc. 2d 548, 549, 184 N.Y.S.2d 1016, 1017 (Ct
Cl. 1959), rev'd,
11 App. Div. 2d 613, 200 N.Y.S2d 852 (3d Dep't 1960), rev'd, 10
N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
155 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), which
denied
recovery for mental and physical injuries caused solely by fright.
15 6 Panunzio v. State, 176 Misc. 290, 28 N.Y.S.2d 927 (Ct Cf. 1941), aff'd,
266 App. Div. 9, 41 N.Y.S.2d 587 (3d Dep't 1943), aff'd, 292 N.Y. 625,
55 N.E.2d 505 (1944).
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of bridges, culverts, and other facilities forming part of the
state highway system.' 57 The state is not liable in flood
claims for damage caused by surface waters flowing from its
facilities' s unless these waters have been gathered and
channelled onto the claimant's property by artificial means. 9
Liability may be based on trespass or negligent maintenance
and construction, 6 ' and the state may also be liable for
flood damages under the ordinary obligations of a landowner, although the work is done by an independent
contractor.'
Accidents occurring at educational institutions maintained by the state produce a number of claims each year. 6 '
Some actions also arise from the operation of vehicles by
the officers and employees of various state agencies. In
both situations, the usual rules of negligence law control, 3
157 Holmes v. State, 32 Misc. 2d 1077, 226 N.Y.S.2d 626 (Ct Cl. 1962)
(bridges); Scamp v. State, 189 Misc. 802, 70 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Ct. Cl. 1947)
(culvert); Loman v. State, 59 N.Y.S.2d 492 (Ct. Cl. 1946) (drop inlet).
158 Gibson v. State, 187 Misc. 931, 64 N.Y.S.2d 632 (Ct. Cl. 1946).
159 Wolfert's Roost v. State. 17 App. Div. 2d 1022, 234 N.Y.S.2d 473
(3d Dep't 1962), aff'd, 13 N.Y2d 719, 191 N.E.2d 904, 241 N.Y.S.2d 848
(1963); Rockwell v. State, 15 Misc. 2d 1074, 182 N.Y.S.2d 422 (Ct. Cl.
1959).
10 McCormick v. State, 289 N.Y. 572, 43 N.E.2d 715 (1942); Schloop v.
State, 18 Misc. 2d 485, 190 N.Y.S.2d 96 (Ct. Cl. 1959), aff'd, 12 App.
Div. 2d 880, 211 N.Y.S.2d 716 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 10 N.Y.2d 716, 176 N.E.2d
736, 219 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1961).
The state cannot escape liability for the
flooding of a claimant's lands on the ground that work was done in conformity with good engineering practice. The state has no greater rights
than an individual under the circumstances.
161 Demoski v. State, 12 Misc. 2d 416, 168 N.Y.S.2d 242 (Ct. Cl. 1957);
Allen v. State, 208 Misc. 385, 143 N.Y.S.2d 867 (Ct. Cl. 1955), aff'd,
2 App. Div. 2d 644, 151 N.Y.S.2d 621 (4th Dep't 1956).
162 The claims usually arise out of athletic contests (Hanna v. State,
46 Misc. 2d 9, 258 N.Y.S.2d 694 (Ct. Cl. 1965)), defective equipment
(Underwood v. State, 279 App. Div. 823, 109 N.Y.S.2d 296 (3d Dep't
1952)), supervision (Brittan v. State, 200 Misc. 743, 103 N.Y.S.2d 485
(Ct. Cl. 1951)), sidewalks (Rue v. State, 11 Misc. 2d 337, 174 N.Y.S.2d 556
(Ct. Cl. 1958)), stairways (Hovey v. State, 287 N.Y. 663, 39 N.E.2d
287 (1941)), and building maintenance (Mitchell v. State, 20 Misc. 2d 381,
195 N.Y.S.2d 511 (Ct. Cl. 1959)).
163 Thus, when the state entrusts a vehicle to one of its employees, it is
liable to a claimant injured as a result of the negligent operation of the
vehicle, whether or not the employee was using the vehicle for state business.
Adams v. State, 269 App. Div. 482, 57 N.Y.S.2d 42 (3d Dep't 1945),
rev'd o, other grounds, 295 N.Y. 946, 68 N.E.2d 44 (1946). In Burmaster
v. State, 7 N.Y.2d 65, 163 N.E.2d 742, 195 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1959), the
wife of a state employee went on a state business trip with her husband
in a state-owned vehicle to assist in the operation of such vehicle, if
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and generally there is little difficulty in the application
thereof. There are also a certain number of claims based
upon the activities of the state police 164 and the negligent
maintenance of state-owned buildings.
In addition to negligence claims, the Court also occasionally hears cases based upon intentional torts: trespass, false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution,
and assault. Claims in trespass usually involve flooding of
property, and we have already considered this type of action.
The other intentional torts involve the person and liberty
of the claimant.
False arrest cases are ordinarily based on acts of the
state police, although other departments of the state exercising police power can and do make arrests. When the
officer acts under a warrant which is valid on its face, he
and the state are protected, unless, of course, he has wrongfully procured the warrant.' 5 Most of the claims for false
necessary. She was injured in an accident involving the vehicle. The state
was held liable, despite the fact that a directive had been issued prohibiting
state vehicles from carrying passengers for non-official purposes. But see
Fitzgerald v. State, 46 Misc. 2d 151, 259 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Ct. Cl. 1965),
in which the state was absolved of liability where the wife of a state
employee was injured while riding in a private car used by said employee
on state business. The presence of the employee's wife in the vehicle
was wholly unrelated to the purpose of his journey. The basis of the
decision was that the state, in granting permisson for the use of the private
vehicle, could not reasonably foresee that its employee would invite his
wife to accompany him, and hence did not assume the risk of any injury to
her on the trip.
:164 The state has been held liable where the state police failed to transmit
a message cancelling an alarm, and such failure was a proximate cause
of the death of the claimant's decedent. Slavin v. State, 249 App. Div.
72, 291 N.Y. Supp. 721 (3d Dep't 1936). Liability was found to exist
where the state police negligently used tear gas on an insane person
who had barricaded himself in the house, where they had no warrant
for arrest or legal right to enter the building. Titcomb v. State, 30 Misc.
2d 902, 222 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Ct. Cl. 1961). Liability may also result from
careless operation of motor vehicles by state police. McArdle v. State,
251 App. Div. 773, 295 N.Y. Supp. 648 (3d Dep't), motion for reargument
denied, 252 App. Div. 706, 298 N.Y. Supp. 996 (3d Dep't 1937); H-erendeen
v. State, 197 Misc. 749, 94 N.Y.S.2d 432 (Ct. CI. 1949), aff'd, 276 App.
Div. 817, 93 N.Y.S.2d 700 (4th Dep't 1949). McArdle involved striking
pedestrians, Herendeen a collision.
See also Russo v. State, 166 Misc.
316, 2 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Ct. Cf. 1938), where a state police car was involved
in a collision while transporting a prisoner, and the state was held liable
for his injuries.
:165 See Nastasi v. State, 275 App. Div. 524, 90 N.Y.S.2d 377 (3d Dep't),
aff'd, 300 N.Y. 473, 88 N.E.2d 658 (1949); Douglas v. State, 269 App.
Div. 521, 56 N.Y.S.2d 245 (3d Dep't 1945), aff'd, 296 N.Y. 530, 68 N.E.2d
605 (1946).
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arrest grow out of situations where the arrest is made
without a warrant. 6 '

In such instances, the validity of the

arrest depends upon probable cause.
Claims

for false imprisonment

ordinarily

are

con-

comitant with claims for false arrest, and the validity of
the restraint usually depends upon the legality of the arrest.

Occasionally, actions for false imprisonment are based on
the commitment of the claimant to a state mental or penal

institution. But, where the order of commitment is valid
on its face, the state is protected' 67 even though the
claimant was improperly sentenced by a court.'68
In malicious prosecution claims, as in those for false

arrest and false imprisonment, the issue is one of probable
cause for the prosecution, and this is a question of law for

the Court.'6 9
Assault claims often arise out of the actions of the state

police.7 0

While a police officer is justified in using force

166 In
the following actions involving false arrest, false imprisonment,
and malicious prosecution, the Courts held that the arresting officers were
justified in making the arrests: Paul v. State, 40 Misc. 2d 328, 243 N.Y.S.2d
104 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (arrest by state police--claimant possessed coin slot
machine); Ranke v. State, 206 Misc. 569, 134 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Ct. Cl. 1954),
aff'd, 285 App. Div. 1113, 141 N.Y.S.2d 516 (4th Dep't 1955) (arrest by
state police--claimant failed to have driver time cards in his possession as
required by N.Y. LAB. LAW § 167). In the following instances, the Court
found that the arrest was not justified: Pawloski v. State, 45 Misc. 2d 933,
258 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (arrest by state police for violation of
N.Y. PEN. LAw § 2034, entry on or detaining lands by force-the state
failed to prove acts of the claimants took place on state lands);
Snyder v. State, 38 Misc. 2d 488, 236 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Ct. Cl. 1963), inodified
o other grounds, 20 App. Div. 2d 827, 247 N.Y.S.2d 757 (3d Dep't 1964)
(arrest by state police for holding more than one driver's license at a timeclaimant actually had a New York and a Massachusetts driver's license.
In this case, the appellate court left open the question as to whether
punitive damages could be awarded against the state).
'167Warner v. State, 297 N.Y. 395, 79 N.E.2d 459 (1948); Williams v.
State,
15 Misc. 2d 721, 183 N.Y.S.2d 216 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
8
16 Noyse v. State, 15 Misc. 2d 1018, 183 N.Y.S2d 253 (Ct. Cl. 1959);
Jameison v. State, 4 Misc. 2d 326, 158 N.Y.S.2d 496 (Ct Cl. 1956), aff'd,
7 App. Div. 2d 944, 182 N.Y.S.2d 41 (3d Dep't 1959).
169 See generally Houghtaling v. State, 11 Misc. 2d 1049, 175 N.Y.S.2d 659
(Ct Cl. 1958); Feller v. State, 207 Misc. 966, 141 N.Y.S.2d 656 (Ct.
Cl. 1955).
170However, some assaults do occur in state custodial institutions:
Rauppius v. State, 15 Misc. 2d 384, 180 N.Y.S.2d 805 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (excessive force used on an inmate of a state hospital by an attendant);
Gerbino v. State, 201 Misc. 3, 109 N.Y.S.2d 862, (Ct. Cl. 1952) (assault
by attendant on mental defective in state school).
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to effectuate an arrest, or to repel physical attack,'
where such force is excessive or unjustified, an assault
results."' The rights to liberty and personal security are
held in high esteem, and in instances where the state police
or any other state agency violates these rights, the wronged
citizen should have redress. By virtue of its waiver of
immunity, the State of New York has provided a means by
which the citizen can obtain satisfaction in such cases
and, at the same time, has afforded protection to itself
from unjustified claims based on groundless accusations.
The foregoing tort cases are indicative of the scope
and variety of the actions brought in the Court of Claims.
The cases cited, while surely not exhaustive, do provide
some idea of the work of the Court in this field. While the
state conducts many activities which have no comparable
private counterpart, the Court of Claims, over the years,
has been able to adapt the ordinary rules of law governing
tort actions between individuals to situations involving the
State of New York. In very few instances has the Court
limited the liability of the state for fear that any further
extension thereof would cast an impossible financial burden
upon the state treasury, or would needlessly hamper responsible state officials in the performance of their statutory
duties.
Contract Claims
The number of contract actions filed in the Court of
Claims is small in comparison to those based on tort and
appropriation. Some few contract claims may involve such
matters as the rental of buildings," 8 the purchase of
171 Phillips v. State, 30 Misc. 2d 912, 222 N.Y.S.2d 633 (Ct. CI. 1961),
where the Court found that a trooper, in attempting to break up a fight,
was attacked and struck the claimant in self-defense.
172 Lippert v. State, 207 Misc. 632, 139 N.Y.S.2d 751 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
The state, of course, is responsible only when its agent is acting within the

scope of his authority. See Nisbett v. State, 31 Misc. 2d 32, 222 N.Y.S2d
867 (Ct. Cl. 1961), where the state was absolved from liability for an
unjustifiable assault on the claimant by an off-duty state trooper out of
uniform; Day v. State, 162 Misc. 39, 293 N.Y. Supp. 528 (Ct. Cl. 1937).
"'-Drislane v. State, 10 Misc. 2d 105, 168 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Ct. Cl.
1957), aff'd, 7 App. Div. 2d 141, 181 N.Y.S.2d 38 (3d Dep't 1958).
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materials,'174 or the authority of an agent to bind the state
contractually.'7 5 However, the usual claim of this nature
arises out of a contract for the construction of a highway
or a building."
These claims are complex, and ordinarily
include multiple causes of action. Large sums are often
involved, and the trial, therefore, can be quite time
consuming.
The State of New York utilizes a unilateral type of
contract in its construction programs. Since this is a very
different type of contract from that usually negotiated
between individuals, the work of the Court in this field is
particularly specialized. State contracts contain numerous
exculpatory clauses which, if strictly construed, might well
deny relief in most cases. The tCourt has, therefore, interpreted these contracts liberally in an attempt to accomplish
substantial justice. The language of Judge Earl in Danolds
v. State 177 is particularly expressive of the Court's approach:
The sovereign can contract and has very many occasions to do so;
it can build canals and public buildings, and engage in public
works, and in carrying forward its projects it makes use of the

instrumentalities which individuals use for the same purposes.

It

must be governed by the same
rules of common honesty and jus7
tice which bind individuals.

In the course of time, the Court of Claims has established a body of case law which is based upon principles which would be applicable if both contracting parties
were private persons. 9 However, in the final analysis,
' 74 Ebbighausen v. State, 276 App. Div. 796, 92 N.Y.S.2d 543 (3d Dep't
1949); Dailey Mills Inc. v. State, 200 Misc. 811, 104 N.Y.S.2d 31 (Ct. Cl.
1951).
'175 Blatt Bowling & Billiard Corp. v. State, 14 App. Div. 2d 144, 217
N.Y.S.2d 766 (3d Dep't 1961).
1- On state highway and building contracts, see Peters, Problems and
Procedure in Highway and Building Contracts with the State of New York,
26 FoRDHAM L. Rav. 628-55 (1958); on public contracts in general, see
COHEN,
177

CONTRACTS AND THE LAW (1961).
See also Atlanta Constr. Co. v. State, 103 Misc.

PU3LIC CONSTRUCTION

89 N.Y. 36 (1882).

233, 175 N.Y. Supp. 453 (Ct. Cf. 1918). For opinions setting forth the
principles for the interpretation of state contracts see Shore Bridge Corp.
v. State, 186 Misc. 1005, 61 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Ct. Cl.), aff'd, 271 App. Div.
811, 66 N.Y.S.2d 921 (4th Dep't 1946); Town and Country Eng'r Corp. v.
State, 46 N.Y.S.2d 792 (Ct Cl. 1944).
1'7Danolds v. State, 89 N.Y. 36, 44 (1882).
2 Atlanta Constr. Co. v. State, supra note 177.
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any decision in this area must depend to a marked
degree on the peculiar circumstances presented. This
is especially true of construction
contract claims
which are usually factually complicated,"'0 and demand a
certain degree of judicial expertise for a cogent determination of the issues.
CONTRIBUTION TO SUBSTANTIVE LAW

Decisions in Court of Claims matters have, over the
years, made major contributions to the general substantive
law of the state in several important areas. Most of the
case law relating to eminent domain, to the construction
and maintenance of highways, and to the operation of
custodial institutions has been formulated in the Court of
Claims. The enlightened decision in Battalla v. State"'
had far-reaching results, and brought about a much-needed
change in the existing law with respect to recovery for
injuries resulting solely from fright.
Another recent and significant decision of the Court
of Claims was Williams v. State."s2 In that case a claim
was filed on behalf of a mother and an infant. The infant's
cause of action was predicated on the state's failure to
180 These contract claims generally involve delays (Endres Plumbing Corp.
v. State, 198 Misc. 546, 95 N.Y.S.2d 574 (Ct. Cl. 1950), ,aff'd, 285 App.
Div. 1107, 139 N.Y.S.2d 319 (3d Dep't 1955)), or extra work (Turner
Constr. Co. v. State, 253 App. Div. 784, 1 N.Y.S.2d 157 (3d Dep't 1937),
modified, 279 N.Y. 243, 18 N.E.2d 143 (1938)).
The questions litigated
may include, for example, misrepresentation of work or site condition (Arborio
v. State, 41 Misc. 2d 145, 245 N.Y.S.2d 274 (Ct. Cl. 1963)), capricious or
arbitrary acts of the state (Shore Bridge Corp. v. State, supra note 177).
reduction or elimination of certain contract items (Trimpoli v. State, 20
App. Div. 2d 933, 249 N.Y.S.2d 154 (3d Dep't 1964)) and availability of
contract site (Johnson v. State, 5 App. Div. 2d 919, 172 N.Y.S.2d 41 (3d
Dep't 1958)), as well as many points of dispute incident to execution of the
contract work. An oft-litigated feature of state construction contracts is the
so-called "release clause," which provides that acceptance of final payment
constitutes a general release of all claims. In almost all cases, acceptance
of such payment has resulted in dismissal of the claim. Buffalo Elec. Co.
v. State, 14 N.Y.2d 453, 201 N.E.2d 869, 253 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1964). For
a discussion of the "release clause" and the legal procedure for securing
payment and avoiding its effect, see Rusciano & Son Corp. v. State, 201
Misc. 690, 110 N.Y.S.2d 770 (Ct. Cl.), aff'd, 281 App. Div. 733, 118
N.Y.S.2d 77 (3d Dep't 1952).
181 Supra note 154.
18246 Misc. 2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
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provide adequate care and supervision which resulted in the
infant being conceived and born out of wedlock to a
mentally deficient mother. Although no precedent existed
for such a cause of action, the Court did not hesitate to
strike out on a new path in the interests of justice. It
was determined that the infant plaintiff had indeed alleged
the breach of a duty owed to her mother and herself, and
was entitled to a trial of the issues.
OPERATION OF THE COURT

Practice
The practice in the Court of Claims is controlled by
the :New York Court of Claims Act and the Rules of the
Court of Claims, and, where the Act and Rules are silent,
by the CPLR.' 83 With some exceptions, the practice is
similar in many ways to that in the supreme court. One
exception is the short statute of limitations for the filing of
claims; " another is the lack of a summons.
An action is commenced by the filing of an original
copy of a claim in the office of the Clerk of the Court in
Albany, either in person or by mail. A copy of the claim
must also be served upon the Attorney General.'8 5 The
183 N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 9(9).
184 N.Y. CT. CL. Acr § 10(9).
Claims for damage resulting to property
not acquired in appropriation matters must be filed within six months
of the acceptance of the work by the state. See Cimo v. State, 282 App.
Div. 317, 122 N.Y.S.2d 751 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 306 N.Y. 143, 116 N.E.2d
290 (1953).
As a result of the short period for filing claims, particularly
tort claims, the Court hears a great number of motions for permission to
file a claim after the time for doing so has elapsed. N.Y. CT. CT. AcT

§ 10(5).
5

18 N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 11; N.Y. CT. CL R. 9. An additional twelve copies
of the claim are required to be filed within ten days of the time of filing.
N.Y. CT. CL. R. 11. Service on the Attorney General may be waived if he
has been served by the Clerk of the Court within the filing time. N.Y.
CT. CL Act § 11.
In certain cases, particularly where property is taken
for the use of an authority, a copy of the claim should be served on the
authority. N.Y. Pu. AuTH. LAw § 358(2). Filing of a notice of intention
to file a claim (N.Y. CT. CL AcT § 10; N.Y. CT. CrL R. 11) serves
only to extend the time to file a claim for tort or contract to two years
from the date of accrual. The filing of such a notice is not a condition
precedent to the filing of a claim. The notice should set forth the same
matters as a claim, except the amount demanded. The original and one

copy are filed either in person or by mail in the Clerk's office at Albany,
New York, and a copy is served on the Attorney General (N.Y. CT. CL. Acr
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claim itself should be a simple, verified statement of the
facts upon which it is based. Since all allegations are
deemed denied,.. 6 the state is not required to file an answer,
but it may serve a counterclaim, to which a reply is
necessary.'87 The pleadings may be amended by an order
of the Court. 8
Pretrial examination may be had by the state upon
five days notice, and by the claimant upon motion, if, in
the discretion of the Court, there is a showing that the
testimony of any official or employee of the state is material
and necessary to prepare for trial.'89 The remedy of disclosure is also available in the Court of Claims by order
of the Court. 9 '
Upon filing, a claim is placed on the calendar of the
district in which it arose (for purposes of trial, the state
is divided into nine districts). The date of issue is the
date of filing,' 9' and there is no requirement for the filing
of a separate note of issue or a certificate of readiness.
§ 11; N.Y. CT. CL. RuLEs 9, 10, 11). In some instances, a notice of intention has been construed to constitute a claim. Chalmers v. State, 271
App. Div. 699, 68 N.Y.S.2d 827 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 690, 77 N.E.2d
8 (1947).
18 N.Y. CT. CL. R. 13.
It is not necessary for the state to plead an
affirmative defense. Taylor v. State, 302 N.Y. 177, 96 N.E2d 765 (1951).
187 N.Y. CT. CL. RULES 14, 15.
188 N.Y. CT. CL. P_ 16.
189N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 17(1), (2).

:190 CPLR 3102(f); DiSanto v. State, 41 Misc. 2d 601, 245 N.Y.S.2d 234
(Ct Cf. 1963), aff'd, 22 App. Div. 2d 289, 254 N.Y.S2d 965 (3d Dep't 1964).
As yet there has been no adjudication as to whether N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 17
has been superseded by CPLR 3102. Some question has been raised on this.
See WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW Yore

CrviL PRAcrrcE

113102.29,

3123.07, where the conflict between CPLR 3102(f) and N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 17
has been noted. The remedy (repeal of both statutes) suggested by the
writers is quite drastic, and may result in the elimination of disclosure from
Court of Claims practice. See Schmiedel v. State, 14 App. Div. 2d 33,
217 N.Y.S.2d 110 (4th Dep't 1961). The Court has granted disclosure.
See Peters v. State, 41 Misc. 2d 980, 247 N.Y.S2d 811 (Ct. Cl. 1964), aff'd,
22 App. Div. 2d 764, 253 N.Y.S2d 260 (3d Dep't 1964), where it was held
that the claimant might obtain admissions on order. The Court will
grant disclosure when the interest of justice requires it, as it has
granted motions for examinations before trial and discovery when authorized.
Moreover, the appellate courts have advised utilization of this procedure.
See Wolfe v. State, 23 App. Div. 2d 136, 259 N.Y.S.2d 13 (3d Dep't
1965). To date, although there is an apparent statutory conflict, little
practical difficulty has been experienced by the Court.

191 N.Y. CT. CL. R. 5.
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Copies of a printed calendar, prepared for each district
by the Clerk of the Court,192 are mailed to each party
at least seven days before the opening of the term. This
constitutes a notice of trial. A calendar call is conducted
at the opening of the term in each district, and ready
claims are tried in the order in which they appear on the
calendar. Claims may be dismissed for failure to prosecute,
but restoration for good cause shown lies in the discretion
of the Court." 3
Pretrial conferences are conducted by the Court in
appropriation matters. The pretrial conference calendar of
appropriation claims is prepared upon the calendar call in
each district." 4
The trial of a claim is conducted by a Court of Claims
Judge in the same manner as a nonjury trial in the supreme
court. 9 ' Unless there is a nonsuit, a decision is rendered
by the Judge after trial, stating the essential facts upon

192 N.Y. CT. CL. R. 3.
293N.Y. CT. CL. R. 7; N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 19(3).
194 N.Y. CT. CL. R. 5a.
'Or N.Y. CT. CL. AT § 12(3). The Presiding Judge may order a claim
heard or determined by more than one Judge, but not more than three.
Two must concur in the decision. Motions are heard by one Judge. In
appropriations claims where the amount of the award is in excess of
$5,000, the Court must view the property. N.Y. CT. CL AcT § 12(4).
Comparable sales are admissible in evidence on direct examination in the
trial of an appropriation claim. A list of the sales used, with pertinent
data, must be served on the opposing party twenty days before trial.
N.Y. CT. CL AcT § 16(1). Evidence of assessed valuation is also admissible in
appropriation cases. N.Y. CT. CL AcT § 16(2). When exhibits are admitted in
evidence upon the trial, each party is responsible for his own exhibits, but they
are filed in the Clerk's office at the direction of the Clerk only when the
Court requires them. However, each party is required to submit a list
of all exhibits submitted by him to the Court and to file the same with the Clerk
within five days after a claim is submitted. N.Y. CT. CL R. 27. Stenographic transcripts of testimony are available from the Court Reporter upon
payment of his statutory fee. N.Y. CT. CL AcT § 5(3). At the opening of
trial it is customary to show proof of jurisdiction by placing in evidence
the letters received from the Clerk of the Court and the Attorney General,
acknowledging receipt of claim and notice of intention, if one was filed.
The claimant also testifies to the non-assignment of his claim. In appropriation claims, the date of appropriation, the date of personal service of a map
and description on the claimant, as well as the date of filing of the claim,
should be placed on record, for such dates control interest allowance. The
date of entry may also be required if entry was made before title passed
to the state.
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which it is based. 9 ' Claims may be submitted to the Court
upon an agreed statement of facts,"' or the parties may
Opportunity is also
submit requests for findings of fact.'
afforded for the filing of briefs, if necessary.'99 Judgment
is entered upon the decision of the Court, and the technical
rules surrounding this process are set forth in Section 20
of the New York Court of Claims Act.
Appeals to the appellate division are taken in the same
manner as appeals from judgments of the supreme court.
Appeals in matters originating in the first, second or third
department are taken to the third department; those arising
in the fourth department are taken to that department.9 '
Appeals may be taken from the appellate division to the
Court of Appeals in the same manner as any other appeal
to that Court. In some instances, appeal may lie directly
to the Court of Appeals from the Court of Claims.'
The Court of Claims has all the powers incidental to
carrying out its jurisdiction. It may order consolidation
of claims or trials, and it may interplead parties and
perpetuate testimony. The Court has jurisdiction to open
defaults and to vacate or amend any process, claim, order
or judgment, in furtherance of justice for any error in form
or substance. It may establish rules for governing the
Court and for regulating practice and procedure, and it
may provide for regular or special terms at such places
as it may determine. 2 ' The Court may fit attorneys'

Decision may be written or oral. In less complex
'99 CPLR 4213(b).
claims, the Court at times gives the decision from the bench at the conclusion of the trial, or shortly thereafter, reserving to the parties the right
2
to submit findings within a reasonable time. CPLR 4 13(a).
197 N.Y. CT. CL. R. 18.
1'8 CPLR 4213 (a); N.Y. CT. CL. R. 26.
199 N.Y. CT. CL. R. 26.
N.Y. CT. C.. R. 29
200 Appeals are covered by N.Y. CT. CL. Acr § 24.
provides that practice on appeal shall be the same as in the supreme court
and the Court of Appeals. N.Y. CT. Cr_ R. 30 requires the successful party
to file the original printed case, with a certified copy of the Order of
Remittitur, within ten days after the filing of the order with the appellate
division.
201 Buffalo Elec. Co. v. State, 14 N.Y.2d 453, 201 N.E.2d 869, 253 N.Y.S.2d
537 (1964).
202 N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 9(5)-(11).

1965 ]

COURT OF CLAIMS

fees,2 3 grant leave to sue as a poor person, 20 4 appoint a
guardian ad litem for an infant,"5 and perform many other
acts incidental to its primary power to render money
judgments against the State of New York.
Administration
Since the Court performs an important state function,
involving other agencies of the sovereign, it is necessary
that its administration be located at the seat of the state
government in Albany. Centralized administration offers
the following advantages: flexibility in meeting case loads
through the arrangement of special terms in areas where
claims are numerous;206 co-ordination with the Attorney
General and other state departments, so that terms and
trials may be scheduled to cope with staff limitations
and with the availability of state officers and employees as
witnesses; 27 uniform rules of practice applicable to all
claims against the state in all localities; consistency in
Court decisions and damage awards,0 8 and a resulting
reduction in the number of appeals which would arise from
inconsistent decisions.
203 Application of Sullivan, 3
Misc. 2d 719, 156 N.Y.S.2d 189 (Ct.
Cl. 1956), and cases cited therein.
204 Lipschultz v. State, 192 Misc. 70, 78 N.Y.S.2d 731 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
205 N.Y. CT. CL. R. 22. It has been held that the guardian ad litem in
a claim against the state should be appointed by the Court of Claims rather
than the supreme court. Hawley v. State, 28 Misc. 2d 150, 217 N.Y.S.2d
107 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
20OThe Presiding Judge makes the assignment of the Judges, and the
Court sets up the terms, determining the length of the terms and number of
parts. Two terms are held each year in each district.
207 The Department of Public Works is involved in approximately eighty
per cent of the claims in the Court of Claims. In the usual claims arising
out of accidents in state custodial institutions, a great number of witnesses
called by both parties are state employees.
208 Decisions of the Court are filed in the office of the Clerk who processes
them, serves the parties and circulates such decisions among the Judges of
the Court for guidance and future reference. All the facilities of the
Clerk's office, as well as the records and transcripts of all adjudicated
claims, are available to members of the Court and their staffs for research
purposes. The Judges meet several times in the course of the year to
discuss the work of the Court and matters of mutual interest. These arrangements tend to coordinate the decisions of the Court. This makes for
uniformity and serves as a guide to the attorney for the potential claimant
and to the Attorney General and the various officers of the state departments
with respect to the law governing claims against the state.
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Although it is centralized for these policy considerations, the Court is local for purposes of trial. Claims
are tried in the general locality in which they arise, a
considerable convenience for claimants, attorneys and -witnesses which does not place too great a burden upon the
office of the Attorney General, which must defend in all
matters. In addition, the Court has its own facilities
and courtrooms in all districts except two, and, during the
course of the Court term, the calendar is handled locally.
A trial in the Court of Claims has always been a nonjury proceeding. This practice has worked exceedingly
well, and has never been subject to criticism. In fact, those
who advocate elimination of jury trials in civil proceedings
often point to the Court of Claims as an excellent example
of the nonjury civil court.
As we have indicated, much of the practice before the
Court of Claims is of a specialized nature, and the Judges
become quite expert in the type of cases they hear and
determine. The experience of the 'Court is extremely important, for it expedites both trial and decision, reduces
the number of appeals, and results in far more efficient
operation.
CONCLUSION
The present Court of Claims is a product of many years
of development. It has evolved from a quasi-judicial
auditing board to a constitutional court. Its existence and
development testify to the state's recognition that, in the
exercise of substantial justice, a citizen who is wronged
by the sovereign should have the legal right to redress unless
compensation would impose unreasonable duties and burdens
upon the state. The Court of Claims has acted efficiently
as the arbiter between the state and the individual, dispensing justice by granting satisfaction to the wronged
citizen on one hand, and protecting the state from groundless claims on the other.
In carrying out its primary purpose, to hear and determine actions by citizens against the state, the Court of
Claims has had to adapt general rules of law, applicable
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to actions between individuals, to actions between individuals
and the state, and to establish, at least in the first instance,
the limitations of the liability of the state. In the accomplishment of its judicial function, the Court of Claims has
created a substantial body of case law which constitutes a
major lasting contribution to the law of the State of New
York.
But the most important contribution the Court of
Claims has made to the judicial system and the people of
the State of New York has been its efficient performance
of the difficult and delicate task of rendering justice in
litigation between citizen and sovereign. It has been aptly
called the conscience of the state.

